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CHAPTER 1 . 
INTRODUCTION 
From the mid 1970s through the 1980s, Zambia experienced a 
tremendous decrease in foreign earnings due to low 
international prices of its main export: copper. As tax 
revenues plummeted, the national debt escalated and the 
Government turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF ) for 
help. Conditionalities attached to the IMF loans caused 
Zambian officials to reconsider some of the mainstays of 
Zambia's social welfare programs. Among the most 
controversial of these programs was the urban maize subsidy 
which provided low cost maize meal to anyone that chose to 
purchase it . The maize subsidy was the single largest 
recurrent expenditure in the federal budget and was a 
significant contributor to the fiscal deficit. When the 
Government tried to terminate the maize subsidy program in 
1986 there was extensive rioting and the program was 
reinstated. 
How can the Government of Zambia continue to provide its 
poorest citizens with basic food needs while bringing the cost 
of the food subsidy program under control? A possible 
solution is to target the subsidy to only those households 
that are the most needy. By eliminating households that are 
not at risk of food shortfalls, the additional expense of 
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providing the subsidy to them is eliminated. However, there 
are large administrative costs and logistical problems if 
every household must undergo an extensive means testing. As 
an alternat i ve to income based means testing, a household ' s 
eligibility status may be assessed according to 
characteristics common to needy households. 
The 1991 Zambian Household Expenditures and Incomes Survey 
(HEIS ) was undertaken by the Prices and Incomes Commission of 
the Government of Zambia with support from the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) , and with cooperation from 
the Central Statistics Office and the United Nations 
Development Program. The HEIS was a national survey including 
2,439 households from every province of Zambia. The survey 
provides information that can be used for evaluating food 
expenditures across Zambia and related characteristics of food 
deficit households. 
The purpose of this study is to: 1) identify food deficit 
households, 2) identify the common characteristics of food 
deficit households, 3) examine the consumption patterns of 
food deficit households, and 4) consider alternative policy 
recommendations based on the results of the findings. 
The second chapter is an overview of the rationale for food 
subsidy programs, alternative program schemes, and methods of 
targeting program benefits to the needy population. Food 
subsidies are a common feature of the social welfare programs 
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of many developing and developed countries alike. Although the 
food subsidy programs of developed and developing nations 
share many of the same characteristics, the objectives of the 
programs are often quite different. The discussion of food 
subsidy programs presented here is generalized to developing 
nations, since that is most relevant to Zambia . 
Chapter 3 gives a brief history of maize subs i dies in 
Zambia. It shows that maize subsidies have long p l ayed an 
important role in the labor and wage policies of Zambia and 
also examines the political climate surrounding the maize 
subsidy program. 
Chapter 4 gives an overview of the 1991 Household 
Expenditures and Incomes Survey, with the various parts and 
types of questions included in the survey. The sampling frame 
and weighting system used for the data are explained. A 
tabular analysis of the distributions of household 
characteristics as revealed by the 1991 HEIS is also 
presented. Strengths and weaknesses of the data are discussed 
with the aim of explaining to the reader some of the 
limitations in analyzing the data and giving suggestions for 
future surveys . 
Chapter 5 describes the distribution of income for Zambia, 
using expenditures as a proxy for income. A detailed 
explanation of the construction of deciles , estimation of the 
Lorenz curves and the calculation of Gini coefficients is 
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given before the results of these measures are reported. 
Chapter 6 explains the methods used to define poverty for 
the purposes of this study. Two poverty lines were drawn 
defining an "extreme poverty group" and a "poverty group". 
The method for drawing the poverty lines is explained in 
detail and its relevance to food deficit households is 
explained. Household size and composition were adjusted for 
in order to create a uniform measure of food consumption 
welfare: per adult equivalent food expenditure. 
Misclassification analysis is explained and then used to 
examine the reliability of alternative measures of welfare as 
a basis for creating a poverty line for defining food deficit 
households. 
Chapter 7 presents an analysis of each potential targeting 
indicator and various measures of the effectiveness of each 
indicator . The formulas for calculating the poverty measures 
and the implications for their use are presented first . The 
targeting indicators examined include: geographic area , size 
of household, age distribution of household, characteristi c s 
of the household head, and income sources. 
Chapter 8 presents another method for examining the 
usefulness of the same set of targeting indicators as 
presented in chapter 7. This analysis relies on ordinary 
least squares regression to examine the impact of the 
targeting indicators on per adult equivalent food expenditure, 
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and probit analysis to examine which targeting indicators are 
significant in predicting inclusion of households in the two 
poverty groups. 
Chapter 9 is a surrunary of the results of the study and 
presents a discussion of the implications of the results for 
policy alternatives and their implications for effectively 
meeting the food needs of Zambians. 
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CHAPTER 2 . 
BACKGROUND ON CONSUMER FOOD SUBSIDIES 
Policy makers face many challenges in designing a food 
subsidy p rogram. They must balance the interes ts of competing 
political objectives and economic sectors while meeting fi s cal 
restraints in deciding which type of program is best suited to 
the needs of the affected population. 
This chapter wi l l b roadly discus s the motives, objectives 
and d esign alternatives involved in creating food subsidy 
programs . A brief discussion of the economic implications, 
both macro- and microeconomic, of food subsidy programs is 
also included. 
Rationale for Food Subsidies 
Governments are entrusted with the responsibility of the 
well-being of the people which they serve . It is not 
surprising then that most, if not all, nations subsidize food 
to all or part of their citizenry. The rationale for such 
programs, be it stated explicitly or kept hidden from public 
scrutiny, varies from country to country and even from policy 
maker to policy maker. Some programs are dictated by the 
social goals of alleviating poverty , reducing infant mortality 
and/or i mproving the general nutritional status of the 
population. Other food subsidy programs directly serve the 
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political aims of a ruling party or are concessions to 
powerful indus tries seeking to exploit depressed wages. In 
the case of most poor countries, all of these objectives 
coexist to create an environment where specific policy goals 
are difficult to discern or to evaluate independent l y. I t is 
possible , though , to describe the intended effects of various 
policy initiatives . 
Income Transfer, Income Distribution, and Improved Real 
Purchasing Power 
Food subsidies are a traditional way to increase the amount 
of food available to the poor , by decreasing the relative cost 
of food and , indirectly , providing income to those making food 
purchases. Therefore, an income transfer to some population 
group is inherent in all food subsidy programs, whether it is 
an explicit goal of the program or not. If the subsidy is 
generally applied to a commodity that is available for 
purchase by all people, the greatest transfer will go to those 
who purchase more of the good. If the commodity being 
s ubsidized is a normal good then wealthier buyers will receive 
a greater absolute transfer , proportionate to the quantity 
purchased. 
Since income elasticities of demand for food are usually 
less than unity, poorer consumers will receive a larger 
transfer relative to their income because poorer populations 
tend to spend a greater proportion of their income on food. 
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Thus a 10% decrease in food prices may raise real incomes of 
households in the poorest decile by 6 to 8 percent while those 
households in the top decile may benefit by only a 1 to 3 
percent increase (Pinstrup- Andersen, 1985). If the commodity 
being subsidized is an inferior good then poorer people will 
receive both larger absolute and relative transfers. 
Targeting seeks to maximize transfers to a particular group 
(usually the most needy) while minimizing transfers to other 
groups . 
Welfare goals are of ten tied to food subsidies due to the 
belief that the increase in food consumption will be greater 
than with a real income cash equivalent. This belief is well 
founded when the price subsidies are for unlimited quantities 
due to the combined income and substitution effects of the 
price change. Changes in relative prices lead to changes in 
the composition of the household's optimal food basket. The 
income effect is determined by the share of the household's 
budget going to the subsidized commodity and the income 
elasticity of that commodity. If the subsidy is limited to 
quantities less than what would have been purchased without 
the subsidy , so called inframarginal quantities, then the 
transfer is limited to a pure income effect. 
The transfer of income to subsidy recipients is realized 
through increased real purchasing power. In addition to the 
increase in the consumption of the subsidized commodity that a 
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recipient may enjoy, he or she may also benefit b y s pending 
less on the commodity than would have been neces sary without 
the s ubsidy, and spending the savings elsewhere. This 
increase in purchas ing power is certainly realized in the 
short run, but if the subsidy program is of significant 
magnitude, real wages, sensitive to food prices, may adjust 
downwards . This suggests that if the redistribut i on of 
incomes is a policy objective, then the use of food subsidies 
may be an inefficient means of achieving this end. 
Reducing the Incidence and Severi ty o f Nutri t i onal 
Def i cienci es 
Income and price elasticities of staple foods are higher 
(in absolute terms) for the poor than for higher income groups 
(Alderman , 1986). Therefore price subsidies can be very 
effective in increasing food consumption by poor households. 
Since the poorest segments of a population tend to experience 
the highest rates of malnutrition , effective targeting to poor 
households can be expected to reach those most in need. In 
addition to the direct effect through increased consumption of 
the subsidized food, savings realized from the purchase of 
subsidized staples (income effect) may be spent on food 
providing other essential nutrients, thus improving the 
general nutrition of the household. Particular commodities 
that address identified nutritional deficiencies in the 
population may be chosen to be subsidized. Subsidies are 
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sometimes applied to enriched foods in order to provide them 
at a similar price as the usual product, and provide 
particular micronutrients deficient in the general diet. 
However, subsidies on particular foods may not meet 
specific nutritional deficiencies, because changes in relative 
prices may lead to cross-commodity substitution effects which 
are nutritionally less desirable. A subsidy on a preferred 
staple may be sufficient incentive to a poor consumer to 
purchase it over an inferior staple he or she would have 
bought in the absence of the subsidy, even if doing so 
actually decreases his or her overall intake of essential 
nutrients. But with good data and the tools of economics, 
these undesirable substitution effects can be identified and 
often avoided. 
Targeted schemes that include health and nutrition 
education components may enhance the nutritional effects of 
the subsidy. Subsidized food schemes are often targeted to 
those who are either malnourished or at risk of becoming 
malnourished, such as children and pregnant and lactating 
women. Pregnant and lactating women are often targeted to 
improve prenatal nutrition, thus reducing low birth weights 
and subsequent infant mortality. Programs targeting children 
are designed to improve the physical and mental development of 
children which, in turn, increases the children's productivity 
for the rest of their lives. School feeding programs are 
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intended to enhance the performance of children in the 
classroom, thus increasing returns on education expenditures 
(Pollitt, 1990). However, these programs may not always 
effect any real gains in decreasing malnutrition among 
recipien t children if their parents subsequently reduce the 
amount of food given to them at home. Programs which provide 
food through clinics to mothers with malnourished infants are 
sometimes criticized for providing an incentive to mothers to 
keep at l east one of their children undernouris hed. These 
examples further illustrate the importance of cross-commodity 
substitution effects and related household behaviors in 
response to a food s ubsidy. 
Food Security and Food Self - Sufficiency 
Food security may be defined as the ability of a person, 
household or nation to ensure a steady and adequate food 
supply . In many countries where the food storage and 
distribution infrastructure is poorly developed the 
availability of food is highly correlated with the season. At 
harvest time there is a glut and food prices are low, but as 
stores are depleted, nearing another harvest, prices can 
escalate dramatically. Poor households that must rely on 
purchased food, or lack resources and storage facilities to 
bridge the harvest season, may b e unable to afford sufficient 
quantities to meet their nutritional needs. Food subsidy 
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programs may be designed to stabilize prices across regions 
and time by providing the subsidized commodities in quantities 
to meet market demand at a predetermined target price . 
However, market distortions can result from speculation by 
private traders on future government interventions . 
The most severe price fluctuations tend to be found in 
rural areas with the least developed markets (Sahn, 1989 ). 
Government initiatives to stabilize prices may discourage the 
development of a competitive private grain trading sector and 
may actually aggravate price fluctuations by reducing the 
number of private traders . 
Food self -sufficiency is the ability of a country to meet 
its demand for food without having to resort to imports. A 
country that is food self-sufficient may still not be food 
secure if the food is too expensive for the poor to be able to 
purchase an adequate diet. Any increase in the food self-
sufficiency of a country will not change the level of food 
security unless it is accompanied by an increase in the 
incomes of those households that are the most food insecure. 
A program to increase the production of a country's preferred 
staple while neglecting the traditional "poor people ' s foods" 
may further increase inequalities in income distribution by 
providing lower priced commodities to wealthier consumers. 
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Political Stability and Advantage 
To be able to ensure the support of its citizens, 
governments enact entitlements to benefit key groups . In most 
developing nations these key groups are civil servants and 
urban workers. Therefore it is not surprising that in many 
countries food subsidies have come to be perceived as a social 
contract and any attempt to reduce or eliminate them is met 
with resistance, from both within and without the government. 
Leaders act not only out of a desire to maintain power but 
also to pursue ideals of social justice, economic growth and 
improvement of t h e standard of living in the country. But 
before politicians can effect any altruistic goals, they must 
remain in a position of sufficient power to do so . Therefore 
it is not as cynical as it may at first seem to analyze the 
political calculations of food subsidy programs in terms of 
power politics . 
Whether food subsidies originate from a populist movement 
which seeks to redistribute wealth , or an emergency situation, 
once a bureaucracy is established or a policy is designed to 
benefit particular special interest groups , it can be very 
difficult to remove. Subsidies become an important source of 
income for some groups, be they direct recipients or 
businesses tied to the production , processing or 
transportation of the commodity, forming powerful special 
interest blocks . Even people who may benefit very little or 
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even not at all from food subsidies tend to form strong 
opinions about these policies. The safe thing for any 
politician to do is support the program or better yet, expand 
it. 
Governments may institute food subsidies as a means of 
subsidizing wages in some sectors of the economy, and 
extracting revenue from the farm sector. Real wages may 
adjust downward in response to lower food prices, benefiting 
any industry that relies on wage earning laborers. The 
government itself may be the largest single employer and the 
largest benefactor of lower wages. In countries with a large 
traditional farming sector it is difficult to tax the earnings 
of farmers directly. If the government imposes a system of 
food subsidies that places the burden of the subsidy on 
farmers , through lower producer prices, then they can 
effectively tax farmers to support the operational costs of 
the government. 
Rural producers need not always be the losers. They may 
benefit from food subsidies through increased demand, 
especially when government expenditures on the program are 
financed through tariffs and taxing urban workers. An 
alternative method of keeping food prices low is to subsidize 
agricultural inputs or transportation services . In these 
ways, rural voters as well as transportation service and 
agricultural support sectors benefit. 
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Types of Consumer Food Subsidies 
Food subsidy policies may be placed into two categories : 
explicit and implicit subsidies. Explicit subsidies entail 
direct costs to the government while implicit subsidies do 
not. Examples of explicit subsidies would be food stamps or 
food commodities that are purchased by the government and then 
resold in the market below cost. Implicit subsidies are 
policies designed to affect the price of foods without any 
government outlay, such as price controls, exchange rates, 
tariffs and quotas. Most countries maintain a variety of 
policies that are of ten contradictory in their impact on food 
prices . The degree of taxation or subsidization of food is 
the net effect of all policies in the country ' s food policy 
regime . 
Food subsidies must entail some costs: fiscal, economic, 
noneconomic, or most likely, all three. Fiscal costs are 
those paid directly by the government to procure the food, 
transport and distribute it, and administer the program. 
Economic costs are more difficult to quantify and are the 
source of much of the controversy surrounding food subsidies. 
These economic costs result from inefficiencies in the 
production and consumption of agricultural produce due to the 
imposition of taxes, tariffs, quotas and price controls 
designed to benefit some particular sector. The benefits of 
food subsidies are often less easily measured. They may 
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include the value of increased labor productivity, human 
capital gains through improved educational achievement, 
reduced health care costs, etc., as well as the subjective 
value that a society places on the consumption gains accruing 
through increased food consumption/welfare of the poor . 
Policy makers must consider fiscal, economic and noneconomic 
costs along with potential benefits of the program when taking 
new policy initiatives . 
Expl i cit Food Subsidies 
A food subsidy is said to be explicit if it is programmatic 
in nature and funded through government outlays . Explicit 
subsidies may be categorized as either project or nonproject 
programs. Nonproject programs are general subsidies that 
reduce the price of the commodity in the open market where 
anyone may take advantage of the subsidy. General subsidies 
such as this will not have a progressive effect on the 
distribution of income if wealthier consumers purchase more of 
the commodity . Project subsidies, which offer a subsidized 
commodity as part of a structured project, are designed to 
transfer income to lower income groups as well as to ensure 
that these groups achieve a desirable level of nutrition. As 
the group designated to benefit from the program becomes more 
narrowly defined and as more measures are taken to avoid 
nondesignated groups from benefiting, the fiscal cost 
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attributed to the administration of a project increases. 
Unrestricted Food Price Subs i d i es 
Unrestricted food price subsidies are not rationed and 
consumers are allowed to purchase as much as they want of the 
subsidized commodity at the below-market price. Nor are 
unrestricted food price subsidies targeted to any specific 
group , although the program may be limited to particular times 
of the year when there are seasonal shortages. The below 
market price is maintained through direct government market 
interventions such as import subsidies, subsidies to 
processors, or sale of stocks at below free market price. Any 
stigma attached to participation in the program is often small 
if the subsidy is on a common staple and all people can 
readily take advantage of it. Since consumers may purchase 
unlimited quantities, consumption will increase through both 
income and substitution effects for normal goods. 
Unrestricted subsidy programs have very low administrative 
costs because there are no expenditures for means testing on 
targeting criteria , issuing and printing of ration books, or 
ration shops to maintain. Also, unrestricted subsidies do not 
require large numbers of skilled personnel for administration; 
a key consideration in a poor country with a shortage of 
h i ghly educated workers that could be put to better use 
elsewhere. 
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These programs do incur of ten large operating costs in the 
areas of procurement and distribution due to the very large 
quantities of food involved. The costs of such unrestricted 
subsidy programs tend increase over time because the large 
numbers of people participating in the program come to regard 
the subsidy as a social contract and are very sensitive to any 
change in the nominal value of the corrunodity. Even a small 
increase in the price at which the government (or parastatal ) 
purchases the corrunodity can lead to large increases in the 
cost of the program. 
Consumers that are not needy may participate in these 
programs which costs the government more than if only poorer 
consumers were to receive the benefit. While this constitutes 
leakage of subsidy benefits, it may be more expensive to 
initiate a program to screen out higher income participants if 
a large proportion of the population is poor and eligible. 
One approach to avoid this problem is to subsidize inferior 
goods that only poor people will buy. Another alternative has 
been to sell the s ubsidized products only in stores or markets 
with a high proportion of poor customers. 
Food Stamps 
Food stamps are stamps or coupons that may be used like 
cash in the purchase of food. Any state or private retailer 
participating in the program accepts the stamps at face value 
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and can redeem them for cash at a bank or government office . 
The number of stamps issued to a consumer depends on some 
income or targeting criteria. 
Since food stamp programs utilize the existing market for 
the eligible commodities, there are no program costs 
associated with procurement, storage and distribution. 
Administrative costs can be significant though, due to the 
bureaucracy necessary for determining eligibility of 
households and preventing ineligible households from 
participating, a s well as monitoring and reimbursing store 
claims . The cost of printing and securing the coupons may be 
substantial, especially if the issuing country does not have 
the facilities to print them domestically . Food stamps must 
be of sufficiently high quality paper and printing to deter 
counterfeiting. 
If potential recipients cannot gain access to the program 
or are unable to utilize the stamps in their local market then 
they do not benefit from the program. If vendors are unable 
to readily exchange the stamps for cash or even if they feel 
that the government may default in honoring the stamps then 
they may decline to accept them or refuse to accept them at 
their face value. Only a well organized and efficient 
administration of the program can assure participants . 
The principal advantage of a food stamp program over other 
types of food subsidies is that price distortions that result 
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from other schemes are largely avoided. The increased demand 
due to larger purchases of the program goods by those 
receiving the stamps, may even stimulate production and 
trading activity. While these benefits will be realized in a 
competitive market, if the market is subject to price fixing 
then the increased purchasing power that stamp recipients 
enjoy may be nullified by higher prices and non-recipients 
suffer a decrease in purchasing power. 
Food stamps that apply to a large number of foods may be 
limited in their ability to effect changes in the composition 
of food purchases. For households receiving an amount which 
is less than the amount they would have spent on eligible 
goods in the absence of additional income , the food stamp 
benefit is, in effect , an income transfer only. If one 
objective of the food stamp program is to boost the food 
consumption of a particular commodity by a target amount, then 
a food stamp program may be less efficient than an alternative 
program because the quantity increase in consumption is only 
affected by the income transfer inherent in the subsidy. 
Thus, food consumption will be increased through the income 
effect but not through substitution effects , which are often 
significant in unrestricted food price subsidy schemes. 
Food stamps have a face value that may only be realized by 
purchasing food or, in some cases, specified foods. However, 
recipients can sell the stamps at below face value in order to 
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procure cash for other purposes. Although the recipient still 
receives an income transfer it is reduced and another person 
receives part of the transfer targeted for the original 
recipient. This sort of leakage can be very difficult to 
control. 
Rationing 
Rationing involves restricting the quantity of a subsidized 
product to a per capita or per household limit. The main aim 
of rationing is to limit the availability of the subsidized 
food to within the fiscal constraints of the program. 
Rationing also helps to ensure that there will be sufficient 
supply of the subsidized commodity for the eligible 
households. 
Rationing most often restricts quantities to less than 
would have been purchased in the absence of the ration and, as 
such, limits the income transfer inherent in the subsidy. 
This is important in reducing the absolute transfer to higher 
income households while providing a substantial relative 
transfer to lower income households . Targeting may be 
achieved also because higher income households may deem the 
process of obtaining a ration card or waiting in line for the 
subsidized product not to be worthwhile given the limited 
quantities. 
In planning a rationing program it is necessary to evaluate 
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whether the savings in expenditure over an unrestricted food 
price program are sufficient to cover the increased 
administrative costs. Any reduction in expenditures through 
procuring, storing and distributing a smaller amount of food 
in a rationing program will be weighed against increased 
administrative costs of issuing ration cards and preventing 
any abus e , and the costs of operating ration shops and 
coordinating delivery points. Skilled local administrators, 
often i n short supply, are needed to implement such a program . 
Direct Distribution and Interventi on 
Sometimes food is distributed free of charge to individuals 
or households as either relief aid or as part of a social 
welfare program conducted through, for example, clinics or 
schools. In the case of relief programs, the recipients are 
too poor to buy a sufficient amount of the commodity at any 
price, as happens in famine situations. More often though, 
direct distribution of food is tied to an existing social 
program as an incentive for participation in the program or to 
increase returns realized through the program. Examples of 
such distribution are dried milk given to mothers 
participating in a well - baby program or a school feeding 
program that provides a meal to all school children every 
school day. 
Food distribution of ten enhances returns to other program 
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expenditures. For example, children that receive food during 
the school day perform better leading to a greater return 
reali zed on education expenditures (Pollitt, 1990). Women 
participating in prenatal programs who receive adequate 
nutrition tend to give birth to fewer low birth weight 
children and therefore reduce c h ild mortality (Kennedy , 1988). 
Implicit Food Subsidies 
An implicit subsidy allows the government to affect food 
prices while entailing no direct fiscal costs. This is done 
by constructing policies that distort prices and lead to 
income transfers between private sectors, often from producers 
to consumers. The costs involved i n implicit subsidie s are 
therefore economic and the source of much inefficiency and 
controversy . The twin objectives of providing low - cost food 
to urban residents while maintaining producer incentives are 
of ten incompatible if the government is unable to expand 
fiscal expenditures. 
Uncompensated Price Controls 
An uncompensated price control is a government decree which 
sets the price of a good below free market equilibrium to 
which traders are legal ly b ound to comply . There is no direct 
subsidy expenditure on the part of the government as with 
unrestricted food price subsidies. These policies do not, in 
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the short run, entail any curtailment of supply, so that the 
effectiveness of the price control is dependent on the 
government's ability to enforce the law. Given the dispersed 
and informal nature of food markets in many developing 
countries these laws are ineffective without substantial 
expenditures in policing. 
If price controls are enforced then there will be excess 
demand for the good and consumers will compete for it by 
queuing and trying to gain privileged access. These 
activities have social costs in terms of societal disruption 
and loss of time for productive activity. Lower prices are a 
disincentive to producers unless there is a compensative 
output or input pricing policy. The extent of these problems 
depends on the difference between the controlled price and the 
free market equilibrium . Although in the long-run, producers 
facing lower prices wil l decrease production, thus 
exacerbating the degree of the price distortion and leading to 
possible shortages. 
Uncompensated price controls have shown to be effective 
only under exceptional conditions . In times of economic 
duress, such as war or famine, such price controls may work 
because the citizenry of a country recognize the importance of 
such measures and suppliers may be willing to support them in 
the short run. 
25 
Overval ued Exchange Rates 
Many developing countries utilize exchange rate policy to 
achieve a number of economic goals, and lower consumer food 
prices are often an unintentional, yet significant, side 
effect. Typically, overvalued exchange rates are implemented 
as part of an import substitution policy regime that supplies 
cheap inputs to nascent industries while placing high import 
tariffs on finished goods. Overvaluation may also be the 
result of the "Dutch Disease"; that is, a boom in an enclave 
industry, earning large amounts of foreign currency and 
increasing the value of the domestic currency, while effecting 
no growth in other sectors of the economy. 
Agricultural products, though, are usually not protected to 
the degree of the amount of the subsidy implicit in the 
overvaluation of the domestic currency. Subsequently, an 
overvalued domestic currency depresses domestic food prices in 
two ways. The first is by subsidizing imports through 
increasing the purchasing power of the domestic currency on 
the international market. The second is by creating an export 
barrier to domestic agricultural produce by making domestic 
produce more expensive on the world market. 
Overvalued exchange rates further affect agricultural 
production through shifts in resource allocation between 
sectors. An overvalued currency will cause the price of 
tractable agricultural products to fall relative to the price 
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of nontradables and imports in the nonagricultural sector . In 
the long run , investment will be attracted away from 
agriculture and into nontradables and import competing 
sectors. As the agricultural sector contracts, there will be 
an increased demand for imported foods with high opportunity 
costs involved in financing those imports. 
Tariffs, Taxes and Quotas 
The government may pursue policies designed to lower food 
prices by affecting the supply of food in the domestic market. 
These policies are generally implemented at the border and 
take the form of export taxes and quotas. Such measures 
divert potential exports to the domestic market by physically 
limiting the amount exported, in the case of quotas, or by 
reducing price incentives to exporters as with export taxes. 
Trapping exportable commodities within the country increases 
the domestic supply and depresses prices to consumers. 
Economic Effects of Food Subsidies 
The impact that food subsidies have on other sectors of the 
economy can be profound, especially in poorer countries where 
food expenditures represent a very large share of household 
expenditures and where farming households make up a large 
proportion of the population . It is important to note that 
the relationship between food policy and micro- and 
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macroeconomic variables is integrated. That is, food policies 
not only affect other aspects of the economy, but are in large 
part constructed to meet objectives concerning those same 
economic aspects . This realization has brought food policy 
into the mainstream of economic policy making. 
In countries where economic planning stresses capital-
intensive industry rather than more labor-intensive forms of 
production, poor households may not be able to achieve incomes 
sufficient to meet their basic needs. Consumer food subsidies 
may be necessary to increase the level of welfare for poor 
households when few opportunities exist for adequate 
employment or the marketing (storage and distribution) of 
agricultural produce is so ineffective as to cause household 
food insecurity. Food subsidies may increase the productivity 
of household members though improved nutrition and health 
status. 
Consumer food subsidies impact the whole range of 
macroeconomic variables, which is why they become a central 
issue in structural adjustment programs. The role of food 
subsidies is intertwined with the government budget, 
inflation, investment, wages, the balance of payments, and 
earnings in the agricultural sector. A careful examination of 
all the implications of a proposed food policy change is 
important to be sure that the policy serves the country's 
overall economic objectives . 
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Microeconomic Effects of Food Subsidies 
Microeconomic effects of food subsidies are those effects 
that directly impact households (or producers ) through 
relative price changes and income transfers embodied in the 
subsidy and through the increased productivity of household 
members who se nutritional status has been improved. If the 
additional real income transferred to poor households through 
the subsidy is, all or in part, spent in a way as to improve 
the health of household members then additional gains in human 
capital will be realized. Food subsidies change the size and 
composition of the household's food basket through increased 
purchasing power as well as changes in relative prices. 
Hous eholds may expend some of the increase in real income on 
more nutritious foods, or a greater variety of foods, thus 
meeting micronutrient n eeds as well as caloric . 
Nutritional effects of food subsidies are often difficult 
to assess due to a lack of inf orrnation on intrahousehold food 
distribution . It may be that those household members that are 
discriminated against at the household level distribution of 
food before a subsidy, will continue to be discriminated 
against after the imposition of a subsidy . Although some 
discrimination of particular household members may continue 
after the subsidy, this does not imply that the intrahousehold 
distribution of food is not optimal. It should be expected 
that the most productive members of the household will have 
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priority in the distribution of household resources. The 
productivity of some members of a household may show a greater 
absolute increase, for a fixed caloric investment , than other 
members. Through the greater productivity of particular 
members , the whole household may benefit proportionately more 
than through a more equitable initial intrahousehold 
distribution. 
To the extent that food subsidies benefit children and 
pregnant and lactating mothers, long-run productivity gains 
may be expected to result from enhanced child development and 
better school performance. Once growth needs are met, 
children utilize additional calories to increase activity 
(Beaton and Ghassemi, 1982). Lethargy among malnourished 
children hinders the natural learning process and studies show 
that properly nourished children perform better in school 
(Pollitt , 1990). 
Impacts on Agri culture 
The effect that consumer food subsidies have on domestic 
agriculture depends on the design of the subsidy scheme , the 
financing of the subsidy, the agricultural policy regime of 
the country and characteristics of the agricultural sector. 
Further, the effect of consumer food subsidies on the 
agricultural sector can be either negative or positive 
depending on the supply response of farmers , and the degree to 
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which farmers consume their own produce. 
Implicit subsidies tend to depress producer prices and, in 
turn, farm incomes and production. The effect of explicit 
subsidy programs is much less certain though. Explicit 
subsidy schemes enhance the purchasing power of subsidy 
recipients who, in turn, increase their demand for food. If 
the increased demand is met mostly through increasing imports 
then domestic producers benefit less than when the increased 
demand is for domestic products. If the subsidy is financed 
through forced procurement at below border prices (e.g. 
through a government sanctioned marketing board) then the 
effect on farm incomes and supply may differ by size of farm, 
region and other aspects of agricultural production. 
The degree of targeting of the subsidy program will affect 
the nature and dimensions of the impact that the subsidy has 
on agriculture. Programs targeted to the poor will increase 
their food demand and put upward pressure on food prices . If 
the subsidy is sufficient to cause a shift in the composition 
of the poor's food basket to more preferred foods, then 
producers of the inferior foods may suffer. 
The level of processing of subsidized foods at which they 
are offered to the consumer may have consequences for farm 
incomes. On - farm processing may be an important component of 
the value added to foods sold in the market by farming 
households. Subsidy programs that subsidize processing 
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enterprises, such as millers and bakers, cannot provide 
similar subsidies to farming households and farmers may lose a 
signi ficant portion of their income generating potential. 
Subsidy programs that provide their own storage, 
transportation and distribution systems wrest those operations 
from the hands of farmers and private traders. On-farm 
storage is discouraged through fixed price subsidies that 
remove the incentive to speculate on seasonal price movements. 
And finally, consumer food subsidies and agricultural 
development projects are often linked administratively and 
therefore compete for limited funds. Rising subs idy 
expend itures may lead to falling absolute or relative public 
investment in the agricultural sector with a negative effect 
on producer margins and output. 
Balance of Payments 
As most subsidized foods are internationally tractable , 
most, if not all, subsidy s chemes will have an impact on trade 
in the subsidized good, trade in other goods, and foreign 
exchange holdings. In an open economy, depressed food prices 
as a result of a subsidy program, will cause a shift of 
resources out of food production and into the production of 
other tradables , most likely nonfood export crops . Expanded 
demand for food caused by lower food prices in this case could 
only be met through imports, thus offsetting gains in export 
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earnings. To the extent that the poor have a lower marginal 
propensity to consume nontradable goods than the rest of the 
population (Hazell and Roell , 1983), a subsidy targeted to 
the poor would further erode the country's balance of 
payments. 
The source of funding for the subsidy program may also 
affect the balance of payments. If the program is funded 
through higher taxes then the effect on the balance of 
payments depends on the marginal propensity to consume 
tradables by those households paying the tax. If the program 
is funded by diverting government spending from other areas 
then one must consider whether the funds are drawn from the 
purchase of products (tradables) or from civil service 
salaries (nontradables) . 
Fi scal Costs and Inflati on 
The bottom line in the design and implementation of a 
subs idy scheme is the cost to the government . Consumer food 
subsidies can be very expensive in terms of the share of the 
government budget , the contribution to the government deficit 
or even the share of the gross domestic product. Large 
subsidy expenditures are not necessarily indicative of 
inefficient (in terms of a cost -benefit analysis) subsidy 
programs though, just as large expenditures on education, 
health, and defense are not indicative of inefficient resource 
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allocation. 
Once food subsidy programs are established they can be very 
difficult to eliminate or even to reduce in terms of the size 
of the subsidy . Even small changes in food prices can lead to 
significant changes in the cost of the program. Rapidly 
rising subsidy program expenditures, without a sufficient 
increase in revenues, can lead to a number of problematic 
responses by governments. Governments may finance the program 
through borrowing (either domestically or abroad) increasing 
the fiscal deficit, or by expanding the monetary base. To 
accommodate larger subsidy expenditures, resources may be 
withdrawn from other areas; often agricultural sector 
investments. There is also the temptation to shift the burden 
of financing the subsidy onto other sectors of the economy; 
especially agricultural producers. 
The use of foreign aid or borrowing to finance food 
subsidies (consumption), rather than for investment, transfers 
resources from future generations to the present. If deficit 
financing results in inflation then the burden of subsidies is 
put upon persons with fixed incomes, and if the subsidies 
maintain fixed price commodities which are largely consumed by 
the poor, then inflation will hit middle income consumers 
hardest. 
Depressed producer prices as a result of decreased 
agricultural sector investments and fiscal burden sharing may 
34 
lead to input subsidies in an attempt to widen producer 
margins. These producer subsidies are an additional cost of 
the subsidy program. 
Civil service salaries may be paid in part with food 
subs idies. The fiscal cost of subsidy programs is then 
overstated because it includes part of the public sector wage 
bill. Thus , any savings realized in the reduction of the 
amoun t of the s ubsidy may, in part, be offset by demands for 
pay rais es by public servants. 
Targeti ng 
General food price subsidies incur relatively large fiscal 
costs a n d i mpact all levels of agricultural marketing . To 
abate these problems while still trying to provide 
nutritionally at-risk households with an adequate diet, 
programs are often targeted to households or individuals most 
in need or likely to benefit from the program. Most often, 
food subsidy programs target poor households, although 
households with pregnant or lactating women, small children , 
elderly persons or any other group that has been identified as 
nutritionally at - risk may be targeted. 
Those households that are not at-risk do not receive the 
subsidy, thereby lessening the costs associated with the 
procurement and distribution of the food. There are costs 
incurred in excluding noneligibles, though. As the target 
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group becomes more narrowly defined, administrative costs 
increase and some needy households may be omitted . Targeted 
programs may demand large numbers of skilled administrative 
staff to operate which may be an inefficient allocation of 
personnel in a country with a shortage of highly educated 
workers. The degree of targeting in a food subsidy program 
must represent an optimal use of resources in meeting social 
and economic goals. 
The method of targeting depends on the characteristics of 
the target population and the source of that population's food 
insecurity or shortfall. Programs may be targeted to poor 
hous ehold s through means testing, locating outlets for the 
subsidized food in poor areas, or by subsidizing inferior 
foods that only poor people consume. Pregnant and lactating 
women can be targeted through well-baby programs and children 
through school feeding programs. 
Targeting Characteristics 
Individual testing for need could be very costly, so 
programs are usually targeted to subpopulations likely to be 
at nutritional or other health risk. Households that are 
eligible for participation in a targeted food subsidy program 
of ten qualify by having particular characteristics of food 
deficit households , regardless of their actual food balance 
situation. Those characteristics by which households are 
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defined for eligibility are variables which are highly 
correlated with observed food deficit or p overty . Households 
that have been defined as being in poverty are often included 
in targeted food subsidy programs either because it is assumed 
that poor households are food deficit or because of the income 
trans fer objectives of the program . 
The degree of effectiveness in reaching food deficit or 
poor households through a targeted scheme lies in the quality 
of information available to pol icy makers. Large household 
expenditure surveys are necessary for an analysis of food 
deficit and poor households, and are, in themselves , fraught 
with bias and inaccuracies. Further, there are conceptual 
issues in defining just what is meant by " food deficit" or 
"poor" households. The variables that are associated with one 
definition of "poor " may not be associated with another 
definition of "poor", and likewise with "food deficit" . 
The basic aim of targeting is to reduce the size of the 
recipient population to fiscally feasible numbers. In poor 
countries it is often the case that the proportion of the 
population that may be defined as poor is very large . At this 
point , the d efinition of a recipient population must be made 
to conform to an administratively feasible size so only the 
very poorest or most food deficit households may be included. 
To effectively do this there must be some measure of the 
degree of poverty built into the targeting variables as well . 
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Targe t ing Schemes 
In designing targeted food subsidy programs one must 
consider the cost effectiveness of the transfer of income, the 
cost of the program, coverage of target households, and 
leakages of benefits to non-target households. The ultimate 
choice of a scheme, or combination of schemes, depends on 
existing circumstances and objectives of the program . 
A measure of the cost effectiveness of an explicit food 
subsidy program is the share of the total cost of providing a 
unit of the subsidized food that is transferred to the 
intended recipient . The larger the share the more cost 
effective is the subsidy. Cost effectiveness erodes when 
there is leakage of benefits to non-target households or when 
the administrative costs of preventing leakages offset the 
savings from reduced subsidies . 
Fiscal costs increase as the coverage of the subsidy 
program expands to provide benefits to all eligible 
recipients. Not only does the cost of the subsidy outlay 
increase due to the greater number of participants, but there 
will likely be an increase in leakages as well. Therefore, 
there is some conflict between coverage and leakage. 
Sel f - Targeting 
If one is able to identify a food that is in high demand by 
the target population but rarely consumed by the non-target 
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population, then a subsidy on that food will benefit primarily 
the target group . The subsidy will, in effect, target itself 
because, although all households have access to the subsidy, 
only the target group takes advantage of it. 
When the target population is poor households, effective 
self-targeting is achieved by selecting foods to subsidize 
which are commonly consumed by poor households, have a 
negative price elasticity of demand among the poor (and a 
relatively small price elasticity among wealthier consumers ) , 
and a negative income elasticity among higher income groups 
(an inferior good) . An example of such an inferior good is 
yellow corn meal in an area where white corn meal is 
preferred. 
Children are often targeted in this manner as well. 
Subsidies may be put on milk, enriched weaning foods or baby 
formula. These foods will probably not be inferior goods, and 
may well be considered luxuries , but the nature of the product 
tends to confine the subsidy to households with small 
children. 
The primary advantage of a self-targeted program is that it 
is administratively simple , thus reducing administrative 
costs, and the targ eted nature of the program reduces leakage 
and controls operating costs. The program operates as a 
generalized price s ubsidy where all people are eligible to 
participate and therefore coverage is maximized . There is 
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some accounting for the level of poverty because the mix of 
the subsidized good and preferred foods in a household's food 
basket will shift with changes in income. Income transfer 
will be maximized through both income and substitution 
effects. 
There are some disadvantages to self-targeting schemes 
though. By subsidizing an inferior, and often less expensive, 
food the income transfer inherent in the subsidy may be much 
smaller than that of a subsidy on a more preferred food, which 
may represent a larger share of the budget of the poor. The 
consumption of the product may carry a social stigma 
identifying the household as poor and eligible households may 
not participate, thus limiting coverage. Since all households 
are free to participate it is not possible to exclude better -
off households that choose to consume the product from 
participating. 
It may not be possible to identify a staple with the 
characteristics necessary for an effective self-targeting 
program. Even if there is such a conunodity, it may not be 
suitable for a subsidy program due to seasonal availability, 
limited storage life or inadequate supply. 
It is important to consider the structure of the 
agricultural sector before implementing a self-targeting 
program. The subsidization of a particular food will likely 
affect producer prices for that food. It may be that poor 
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farmers operating on marginal lands and small holdings will be 
most affected by the price change . Shifts in relative prices 
will lead to changes in the mix of agricultural output. 
Supply responses by the agricultural sector will be important 
in determining the eventual cost and feasibility of the 
program. 
Means Testi ng 
An administrative procedure may be incorporated into the 
subsidy program to certify households for participation in the 
program according to some set of criteria. Typically, in a 
poverty oriented program the set of criteria include household 
income, size, and composition. Means testing for 
participation eliminates leakages to wealthier households. 
Means testing is generally employed in the distribution of 
ration cards and food stamps where the amount of the subsidy 
allocated to a household is adjusted by the income level of 
the household . 
Although means testing is a common feature of many food 
subsidy programs, it presents a number of, often significant, 
problems. Means testing is administratively complex, 
requiring a great number of highly literate and numerate staff 
and a highly structured organization . The process of 
certification must be dynamic in that there must be a 
mechanism built into the administration whereby participants 
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can be added and dropped from the rolls. The size and demand 
for skilled personnel of such an organization may account for 
a very large proportion of the total cost o f a subsidy 
program. 
In a program that uses income level as the primary 
criterion of eligibility for participation, the quality of 
income reporting determines the effectiveness of the program. 
In many developing countries there are no records of earnings 
and people may be unable or unwilling to accurately report 
their incomes. This is especially true of the self-employed 
and workers in the inf orrnal sector who are of ten among the 
poorest. Pervasive under-reporting of incomes by informal 
sector workers may discriminate against formal sector workers 
whose earnings are recorded but actually earn less than their 
informal sector counterparts. 
The use of other wealth indicators such as property 
holdings, especially land holdings, has difficulties as well. 
Poorly defined land tenure or traditional land tenure systems 
make the use of land ownership problematic and is only 
appropriate in rural areas. Ownership of other assets may be 
difficult to verify also. Subsequently, means testing is 
often based on targeting indicators which are more readily 
apparent but may be less strongly associated with actual 
poverty (e.g. female headship, number of children, housing 
conditions, ethnic group, age and pregnancy status). 
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Clinic Based Targeting 
Many food subsidies are targeted to children and/or 
pregnant and lactating women. These subsidies are often in 
the form of free rations provided as a component of an 
integrated health and nutrition project that aims to reduce 
infant and maternal mortality. The allocation of the subsidy 
and the subsidized food product depends on the objectives of 
the program. The subsidy may be an incentive to participate 
in the program or may be intended to provide the mother or 
child with a minimum level of nutritional adequacy. 
Children are the most sensitive to nutritional insults due 
to the extra demands of the growth process. Anthropometric 
measurements such as weight for height or skin fold thickness 
are used to determine whether and to what degree a child may 
be malnourished. The presence of a malnourished child is 
often used as a targeting indicator for food deficit 
households , the assumption being that one malnourished child 
implies that all members are at - risk. Allocation of the 
subsidy may vary with the degree of malnutrition of a child. 
There tends to be significant amounts of intrahousehold 
leakage associated with such programs . If a child receives 
food through a clinic or school based feeding program the 
parents often reduce the amount of food given to the child at 
home. If the ration is taken home, then it is often shared 
among other members of the household . While this represents a 
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leakage from the intended recipient (the child), the adult 
members of the household are of ten calorie deficient 
themselves . Allocations of food rations must take leakage 
into consideration if some degree of improvement in the 
nutritional status of the child is a goal of the program. 
Geographic Targeting 
Areas with a high proportion of poor households or 
malnourished children may be targeted for food subsidies. The 
geographic areas targeted may be as broad as urban areas or 
some provinces, or be as narrowly defined as specific villages 
or city neighborhoods. Often the information necessary for 
such targeted programs is already available through census 
data or nutritional surveillance programs. The subsidy 
functions through ration shops that are located in the 
identified areas or certification for participation in the 
program based on place of residence. 
Leakage can be controlled by selling rations in small 
quantities so that travelling from outside the area to buy at 
the ration shop is not worthwhile. Rarely, though, is any 
area homogeneous in terms of income or consumption and so some 
households that do not need the subsidy will have access to 
it and some poor households in otherwise well-off areas will 
be excluded from the program. 
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Impl ications for This Study 
In considering any change in the food subsidy policy 
framework, it is important to evaluate who will benefit from 
and who will be hurt by the change, what kinds of costs are 
entailed, and what policies best fit the economic conditions 
of the country. A set of politically and administratively 
feasible objectives must be established and then used to guide 
the data analysis to derive pertinent information . 
This chapter has examined many issues that are relevant to 
the design of the analysis used for this study . A thorough 
understanding of food s ubsidy issues is essential in 
evaluating Zambia's past experience with food subsidy 
programs; as will be shown in the next chapter . 
Much of the analysis of the 1991 HEIS that follows is 
directed towards addressing many of the issues discussed in 
this chapter. Chapter 5 looks at the distribution of income 
in Zambia; offering some insight into the potential and need 
for income transfer programs . In chapter 6 two poverty 
def i nitions are presented that have implications for the scale 
of a potential targeted food subsidy program. Chapters 7 and 
8 examine the characteristics of the poor and evaluate which 
characteristics could be used as targeting indicators . Food 
consumption patterns of the poor are presented in chapter 9 to 
identify potential self-targeting commodities and those foods 
that would provide effective subsidy transfers to the poor. 
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CHAPTER 3 . 
THE HISTORY OF MAIZE SUBSIDI ES IN ZAMBIA 
From the earliest conception of an economic framework for 
what would become Zambia, agriculture was cons idered of 
secondary importance to mining . Rural communities were viewed 
as little more than labor reserves and markets for cheap 
manufactured goods . The growth of the mining sector though , 
required large consignments of foodstuffs to feed the miners . 
Commercial farms , operated by European settlers, were 
establis hed to provide maize to the mines . This relationship 
between the mining companies and commercial farms became 
ingrained as the mi ning sector grew to dominate the economy. 
A series of government policies served t o strengthen that 
relations hip while ensuring continued privileges for the 
minority European population . One significant policy to this 
end was subsidies on maize. The colonial administration u s ed 
maize pricing policies to generate rents for the commercial 
farmers and to set wage levels in urban areas , whi l e 
transferring much of the burden of the subsidy onto the backs 
of small African producers . 
Independent Zambia inherited this s e t o f policies but made 
few fundamental changes . The Zambian economy continued to be 
dominated by the copper mines while agriculture s tagnated . 
Consumer subsidies for maize became a matter of s ocial 
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contract, jealously guarded by the mine worker's union. The 
crash in copper prices in the early 1970s resulted in ever 
increasing budget deficits as revenues fell and the cost of 
maintaining subsidies mushroomed . The administration of 
President Kenneth Kaunda faced a series of tough choices; how 
to bring the budget under control while not alienating his 
party's political base . 
Pre - independence 
The genesis of maize subsidies may be traced back to the 
labor policies of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) . 
The BSAC administered the territories of Northern and Southern 
Rhodesia where it held the rights to extensive mineral 
deposits. In its early expansionist fervor, the BSAC built a 
railroad crossing the Zambezi River and north to the coal and 
lead deposits . These mines proved unprofitable in the short 
term though , especially given the large base-infrastructure 
expenditures necessary to exploit them. The most productive 
mines were in Southern Rhodesia diverting attention away from 
future development of Northern Rhodesia . The BSAC viewed the 
north primarily as a labor reserve for the southern mines, to 
be extorted throu gh the imposition of a 'native tax' payable 
only in British sterling . 
The mines paid their African employees in part with food. 
The provision of large consignments of foodstuffs to the 
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mines required a reliance on maize which is suited to the 
soils of the Central Plateau region of Northern Rhodesia and 
stores well. Maize then became the new staple of the African 
miners, replacing sorghum, millet and cassava. 
The demand for agricultural products generated by the 
mining proved a boon to many African farmers , so much so that 
the BSAC began to grant the best farm land along the line of 
rail to European settlers in order to prof it from 
transportation revenues and land speculation . As the large 
commercial farms of the white settlers expanded, African 
farmers were squeezed out through increased land rents. This 
pushed the Africans to the native reserves where the land was 
so poor that commercial farming was unfeasible and working in 
the mines was the only way to meet their taxes and buy 
manufactured goods. 
At the same time, policies ostensively meant to encourage 
soil conservation, placed restrictions on traditional 
agricultural systems that employed slash and burn cultivation. 
The marketing infrastructure for African produce was left 
undeveloped and the administration even went as far as 
physically blocking indigenous agriculturalists from entering 
the cash market (Fry , 1979). These policies acted in concert 
to provide a cheap source of labor to the mines and commercial 
farms with little regard for the impact they had on the 
traditional economy. As a result there was substantial labor 
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migration from the traditional, rural economy to the urban 
mining sector, leaving the rural areas with a labor shortage 
and a subsequent shortfall in agricultural production (Fry, 
19 79) . 
In 1924 the BSAC turned the unprofitable administration of 
the territory over to the British Government. The new 
colonial administration took a somewhat more enlightened 
attitude in its relations with indigenous peoples and living 
standards for those living in urban areas improved. In 1927 
some mines began to transport wives and even whole families to 
accompany the miners, resulting in an increased rate of 
urbanization (Fry, 1979). Still, European settlers enjoyed 
significantly more privileges than their African counterparts. 
With the introduction of the plow into native farming 
systems in the 1930s, African farmers were able to move from a 
negligible surplus production to capturing 40% of the local 
maize market (Fry , 1979). European producers became concerned 
that this increase in production would result in an over -
supply of maize and, subsequently, low prices . In 1935 the 
white settler farmers successfully lobbied the government to 
establish the Maize Control Board. By the late 1930s the 
colonial government had constructed a system of price and 
marketing controls that discriminated against African produce 
on grounds of inferior quality or under the assertion that 
increased African production would result in soil exhaustion. 
49 
The Maize Marketing Board held a monopoly on maize purchases 
that impeded the development of private marketing networks and 
enforced the quotas designed to protect European farmers (Kean 
and Wood, 1992) . These quotas set the producer price for 
African farmers at 30% less than that received by European 
producers (Kumar, 1988) . 
After WWII agricultural production expanded but was still 
unable to keep up with the demand of the new urban population. 
Urban consumer subs idies were expanded as the mining sector 
boomed. European farmers continued to enjoy price advantages 
in the market , albeit less than import prices , but still 25 -
30% higher than prices paid to African Farmers (Kean, Wood, 
1992). Th ough the "Native Tax" was altered to b e payable in-
kind, cheap labor was ensured to European farmers in the 1940s 
through the African Labor Corps who were conscripted and then 
provided to the land owners at a 50% wage subsidy (Fry, 1979 ) . 
Urban wages were increasing at this time , in part due to 
new minimum wage laws and, in part due to the realization by 
the mining companies that higher wages resulted in healthier, 
more productive workers. In 1945 the ratio of average urban-
African wages to t h e earnings of their rural counterparts was 
1.9 but by 1953 it had increased to 3.0 (Fry, 1979). Higher 
urban wages were further enhanced by government maize 
subsidies. The resultant rural to urban migration as wages 
increased and new jobs opened up in the expanding mining 
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sector further entrenched consumer subsidies of maize into the 
national economy. 
In the mid 1950s the Maize Control Board was el i minated and 
the new Grain Marketing Board centered pricing policies around 
the method of cultivation rather than the race of the farmer 
(Fry , 1979) . Effectively there was no change in the 
discriminatory nature of the pricing policies though, as 
European farmers still received the higher, subsidized prices 
guaranteed to "improved farms" and most African farmers 
continued receive the lower prices. There was by this time an 
exportable surplus, although at a depressed world price. The 
large commercial farmers continued to receive subsidized maize 
prices, now well above export parity, while most African 
farmers actually received less than they had previously (Fry, 
1979). Producers also enjoyed an export subsidy that 
encouraged increases in production beyond that which a free 
market would bear (Fry, 1979). 
In 1957 the mining industry suffered another slump and the 
colonial Government responded to decreases in tax revenues by 
removing the export subsidy and reducing domestic consumer 
subsidies. The reduction in consumer subsidies also reflected 
a policy aimed at stemming the rural to urban migration as the 
mines could no longer absorb the extra workers . In the early 
1960s consumer and producer subsidies were reestablished that 
again emphasized maize subsidies, guaranteed producer prices 
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and a state-run marketing board with monopoly rights. These 
policies stayed with the country well into independence. 
Post-independence 
Northern Rhodesia gained independence in 1964 but the basic 
grain marketing policies did not change. One exception was 
the removal of thos e policies meant specifically to protect 
European farmers at the expense of the small African farmers. 
By this time though , the large commercial e s tates had little 
to worry about from small farmers after decades of pricing 
policies which had put small farmers at a marketing 
disadvantage. 
The Grain Marketing Board became the National Agricultural 
Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) , a parastatal but without any 
sanctioned monopsony . But due to a pricing structure that did 
not allow sufficient profit margins for the unsubsidized 
private trade to be viable, NAMBOARD effectively operated as a 
monopsony (Kean and Wood, 1992). NAMBOARD bought grain from 
farmers at a controlled (government determined ) producer price 
and then resold the maize to private millers who dis tributed 
the maize meal at controlled consumer prices. Estimated 
margins were built into the difference between the price at 
which the whole grain was sold to the mills and the price at 
which the meal could be sold. The mills, however, were also 
reimbursed by the government for any losses that they may have 
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incurred on their operations. 
In an attempt to address the disparity of incomes between 
the large, predominantly European , farmers and the small, 
predominantly African, farmers the Zambian Government 
introduced a policy of uniform pricing for maize. NAMBOARD 
established buying facilities in remote areas and paid all 
farmers the same price for their maize. Supplying 
agricultural inputs at subsidized prices was also included in 
the mission of NAMBOARD . While this marketing structure was 
very effective in d rawing African farmers into the maize 
market, the inefficiencies associated with it were significant 
(Kydd, 1988). Uniform pricing in conjunction with subsidized 
inputs encouraged maize production on marginal soils better 
suited to other crops. 
This pricing structure was the result of a policy that 
aimed to achieve self - sufficiency in food production while 
maintaining a cheap supply of staple foods in the urban areas. 
The two objectives are often at odds. 
Consumer subsidies became important policy tools for 
realizing a variety of political and economic objectives. 
These included setting wage levels, controlling inflation and 
disbursing entitlements to politically favored groups. The 
benefits from such initiatives accrued mainly to urban 
consumers, often to the detriment of rural producers. Urban 
consumers proved to be very sensitive to any price changes for 
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maize meal and any move to reduce the subsidy was met with 
resistance by powerful labor unions. The Government had 
incentives of its own to maintain the consumer subsidies. 
Payroll expenditures for the large civil service and 
burgeoning public enterprises could be reduced by depressing 
wages through food subsidies, part of the cost of which was 
borne by farmers. 
In attempts to limit costs associated with the subsidy 
program, producer prices were depressed below export parity 
(Pletcher , 1986). Maize producers had no other option but to 
accept these prices because the over-valued Kwacha precluded 
export. From 1965 to 1970 the value of agricultural exports 
fell by nearly half while the value of agricultural imports 
more than doubled (Hawkins , 1991). Chronically low producer 
prices led to a deterioration of rural - urban terms of trade 
(Kean and Wood, 1992) which was estimated to have fallen by 
65% from 1964 to 1980. 
The early 1970s saw a slump in world copper prices and 
foreign exchange earnings from the mining sector fell. Higher 
world grain prices meant that the government now had to expend 
more of its foreign exchange holdings to procure sufficient 
maize to meet the demand created by the low, subsidized 
prices. The already substantial government deficit mushroomed 
and there were severe restrictions placed on access to the 
depleted national foreign exchange reserves. The large 
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commercial far:mers who had previously provided most of the 
marketed maize in Zambia now were unable to procure the 
foreign exchange necessary to buy agricultural machinery and 
other inputs, and that sector of the economy stagnated too. 
In 1977 the consumer subsidy on maize meal was 72%, the 
highest it had ever been, costing the Government of Zambia 
33.5 million kwachas and representing over 10% of GDP in 
agriculture and 6% of the government budget (Kumar, 1988). 
This was clearly an unsustainable state of affairs, but by 
this time consumer subsidies had become regarded by urban 
residents as an entitlement and there was strong opposition, 
especially from the miner's union, to any move to reduce or 
abandon the subsidy . Maize subsidies had evolved from a 
policy to protect European far:mers and subsidize the mining 
industry to being a political tool and a perceived right by 
urban workers. 
By the late 1970s, in accordance with International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) loan conditionalities, the Government 
began to increase producer prices and fertilizer subsidies to 
try to stimulate domestic maize production. By 1980 subsidies 
going to NAMBOARD represented 10% of government recurrent 
expenditure and total subsidies to the food and agricultural 
sector, of which 95% went to directly or indirectly subsidize 
the production and consumption of maize, reached 18% of 
government recurrent spending. The government budget now 
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represented 14% of GDP (Kumar , 1988). While maize subsidies 
were substantially reduced in the early to mid eighties they 
were not eliminated. 
Under sustained pressure from the IMF and donor countries 
to reduce consumer maize subsidies as part of its four year 
austerity program, the Government of Zambia announced in 1986 
a change in maize subsidy policy. Self-targeting was 
introduced whereby the preferred grade of maize meal, called 
breakfast meal, was no longer going to be subsidized while the 
less preferred grade of maize meal, roller meal, would 
continue to be subsidized. The intent of this new policy was 
that wealthier Zambians would purchase the preferred product 
while poorer, needier Zambians would continue to have access 
to the low cost, but inferior, staple. The government would 
save money by no longer subsidizing the most popular maize 
product, which was purchased primarily by the relatively 
wealthy. All roller meal was quickly bought up and not 
restocked as merchants switched to the now more profitable 
breakfast meal. The price of breakfast meal increased by 120% 
(Mukela , 1987) while the subsidy program was effectively 
eliminated overnight. In early December, riots broke out in 
the northern mining towns of Kitwe and Ndola leaving fifteen 
people dead. 
In 1987 President Kaunda reestablished the former subsidies 
stating that, "[the Government] would be committing suicide to 
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remove subsidies on [breakfast] meal at a time of low salaries 
and high unemployment." But he also added, "The economy will 
remain static. We will be spending the money we should have 
spent on social services on subsidizing consumption." He then 
announced the nationalization of all of the country's maize 
milling industries, blaming them for the food shortages. 
In 1988 IMF pressures persuaded Zambian policy makers to 
abandon general maize subsidies for a targeted, maize coupon 
program. The coupon program was introduced in January of 1989 
as the generalized subsidy was being phased out and other 
price controls were relaxed. Urban consumers could exchange 
the coupons at face value in the purchase of either maize 
product while rural consumers , wi th the exception of civil 
servants, were excluded. Initially all urban households were 
included in the target group so that the coupons served as a 
rationing scheme, limiting the amount of the subsidy each 
household could receive. The quantity of coupons given to a 
particular household was based on the number of people 
residing in that household, regardless of income. Targeting 
of the coupons began in July of 1989 after the general subsidy 
had been completely phased out. Any formal sector worker had 
to apply for coupons through his/her place of work and was 
ineligible if the combined income of his/her spouse was more 
than 20,500 kwachas per month. All informal sector workers 
continued to receive coupons through the government but the 
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number of dependents covered was limited to six. 
In 1989 NAMBOARD was dissolved due to inefficiency and 
mounting costs, while cooperative unions were allowed to begin 
to function in its place. In 1990, millers , traders and 
cooperatives began to compete as well and producer prices rose 
by 25-30% while consumer prices actually began to fall due to 
the ability of millers to purchase directly from farmers {Kean 
and Wood, 1992). There was not complete liberalization of the 
maize market though, because the into -mill and retail prices 
of maize meal remained controlled. 
In 1991 Zambia held its first multi-party election since 
the imposition of one-party rule more than twenty years 
before. The new president , Frederick Chiluba, ran on a 
platform of economic reforms including privatization of state 
enterprises, market liberalization, flexible exchange rates 
and reduced government expenditures. As part o f these market 
reforms the coupon program was phased out and had been 
completely eliminated by late 1991. 
While the maize subsidy program was being terminated, a 
drought was spreading over Southern and Eastern Africa 
devastating the maize crop. Zambia imported 1 million tons of 
maize, mostly by concessional arrangements through 
international relief agencies. This imported maize was both 
sold commercially and distributed in the worst affected rural 
areas through food-for-work programs. 
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CHAPTER 4 . 
DATA SOURCE 
This paper presents the results of an analysis of the 1991 
Zambian Household Expenditures and Incomes Survey (HEIS) . An 
overview of the structure and design of the survey will 
provide the reader with an understanding of the nature of the 
data. The sampling frame and weighting of observations is 
explained. A discussion of some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the HEIS data is included with an examination of 
the measure of welfare, food expenditures. Finally, there is 
a tabular presentation of demographic variables to give a 
picture of the population as represented by the HEIS data. 
The 199 1 Househol d Expenditures and Incomes Survey (HEIS) 
In June of 1991 the HEIS was undertaken by the Prices and 
Incomes Commission of the Government of Zambia with support 
from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
in cooperation with the Central Statistics Office of the 
Government of Zambia and the United Nations Development 
Program. The survey was undertaken with several objectives in 
mind, including: 
(i) To update the consumer price index to reflect current 
expenditure patterns 
(ii) To establish a poverty line to be used as a criterion for 
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eligibility for participation in the maize subsidy 
program 
(iii) To conduct a descriptive analysis of incomes and 
expenditures 
(iv) To evaluate the dietary status of households 
(v ) To conduct an analysis of the distribution of income 
(vi) To evaluate parameters affecting demand for food 
(vii ) To evaluate food policy alternatives. 
Many of the programs supported by the Government of Zambia 
and world donor organizations contain poverty reduction goals. 
To facilitate the efficient design of programs and to 
effectively allocate program resources, information is needed 
about the characteristics of the populations that the programs 
are intended to serve. 
The analysis presented here incorporates many aspects of 
the stated objectives of the survey in identifying key poverty 
groups, their expenditure patterns, and their sources of 
i ncome. The closely related concepts of a poverty datum line 
and the distribution of income are important in understanding 
the income transfer effects of the maize subsidy program or 
any proposed food policy change . An analysis of the 
characteristics of poor households and their consumption 
patterns will provide information for effectively targeting 
food assistance programs to those most in need. 
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Sampling Scheme and Sample Weights of the 1991 HEIS 
A multistage, stratified sampling scheme was used for the 
survey with the household being the unit of measure. Zambia 
has nine provinces which are further divided into districts. 
Every province was represented in the sample but the Eastern 
province was over-sampled in order to provide sufficient data 
for a separate analysis (not included here) . Districts were 
defined as being either rural or urban and were further broken 
down into Census Supervisory Areas (CSA's) based on those 
defined for the 1990 Census o f Population, Housing and 
Agriculture. Ten households were randomly selected from each 
CSA . 
The three strata were: (1) the Eastern Province (which 
contained one urban and t wo rural districts), (2) rural 
districts and, (3) urban districts distributed among the other 
eight provinces. Table 1 shows the distribution of districts 
within strata and number of households sampled. Due to the 
non-random nature of the sampling scheme, weights were 
developed and assigned to each household in order to represent 
a national distribution (Loughin , Fuller , Carriquiry , 1992 ) . 
This national distribution was based on the 1990 census and is 
constructed such that the sum of the weights i s the total 
number of hous eholds in Zambia. All statistics presented here 
have utilized this weighting system. 
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Table 1 Sampling frame for the 1991 Zambian HEIS 
Number of Number of 
Households Weighted 
Strata Province District Sampled Households 
Eastern Eastern Chadiza 93 25 ,864 
Chi pa ta 349 88 , 258 
Petauke 324 89,041 
Rural Central Kabwe Rural 157 110,645 
Mkushi 73 52,872 
Luapula Mwense 71 43,514 
Samf ya 110 66,797 
Northern Chilubi 31 18,558 
Mporokoso 57 35,113 
North-Western Zambezi 55 65,717 
Southern Choma 111 121,548 
Kalomo 121 145,242 
Western Mongu 104 115,120 
Urban Luapula Mans a 184 109,625 
Southern Livingston 53 40,812 
Copperbelt Kitwe 212 144,542 
Lusaka Lusaka Urban 334 157,655 
Total 2 439 l 430 923 
Survey Design and Data 
The 1991 HEIS col l ected information concerning household 
level expenditures, transfers and business expenses. 
Individual level information was collected on demographic 
variables and incomes. The information was collected in June 
of 1991, weekly for four weeks . There were 2930 households in 
the original sample but the data used for this report consists 
of 2439 households. Households were dropped from this 
analysis if they did not have complete identifying information 
or did not report food transactions in all four of the 
interviews. Failure to report food transactions in all four 
interviews was used as an indicator of an incomplete survey. 
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The survey consisted of six parts. 
1. Household Identification Information includes the 
location of the household and name of the household head. 
2. Particulars of Household Members includes demographic 
information on all individuals in the households. 
3. Household Consumption and Expenditures includes 
expenditures, barter, and consumption of home product ion 
for food, beverages, and tobacco. It also includes 
expenditure on clothing, housing, medi cal care, 
education, recreation, transportation, conununication, 
furniture , gifts given, and other goods and services . 
Quantity and value of goods were recorded. 
4. Sources of Income includes individual level 
information on cash and in-kind income from salaries, 
wages, agriculture, manufacturing, repairs , marketing, 
food and catering services, informal sundry services, 
mining, and other sources. Other sources of income 
include rent, interest payments, pensions, bonuses, etc. 
Agricultural income includes type and quantity of foods 
produced as well as quantity sold, retained, and 
consumed . Income also includes gifts received, 
scholarships, and other transfers. 
5. Operational Expenses on Self - Employment Activities 
includes information on business expenses incurred from 
agricultural, manufacturing, repairs, formal and informal 
marketing, food services, sundry services, other 
business, and mining operations. 
6. Maize Meal Coupon Survey includes information about 
the household's participation in the coupon program as 
well as the amount of maize meal obtained through the 
coupon program. 
Not all information was collected at each of the four 
visits. The food expenditures and income sections were 
completed on each visit while the household particulars were 
collected only at the first interview and the maize meal 
information at the last . The reporting periods varied by 
question so that frequent incomes and expenditures were 
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recorded weekly and less corrunon i ncomes and expenditures were 
recorded for longer periods o f time . These different 
reporting periods more accurately represent average incomes 
and expenditures. 
The HEIS data are excellent in many ways for an analysis of 
poverty and expenditure patterns in Zambia but, unfortunately, 
much useful information was not included. The HEIS data were 
particularly thorough in food expenditures data though, making 
them well suited to an analysis of food deficit households and 
their consumption patterns. Also, there is information on 
nonfood expenditures that make it possible to examine complete 
household budgets. Detailed information on household food 
expenditures were recorded and broken down by home produced 
and purchased foods. The sample was sufficiently broad to 
include households from all regions and levels of 
urbanization. Food consumption patterns of various regions 
may be accurately identified using these data. There is a 
lack of information on foods consumed away from h ome though, 
and this is especially pronounced in the consumption patterns 
of older children. The food expenditures data then should be 
considered to represent the consumption patterns of households 
and not the consumption patterns of individual members of the 
household. 
There are other limitations to the data . In addition to 
the information gathered in this survey , other factors need to 
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be included. The collection period was one month (June) , and 
this period immediately follows the maize harvest . Data 
collected over the period of a year, rather than a single 
month, would more accurately represent the expenditure and 
income patterns of rural households, especially. Also, no 
information was available on the seasonal price and 
consumption fluctuations in which are particularly important 
in the post-maize harvest period. There are no data on asset 
holdings of households such as land, buildings, livestock, 
etc. Such data would provide insight into the wealth status 
and access to productive resources of households that 
expenditure and income data cannot. Nor were data on 
household stores of grain or food included that would provide 
estimates of food availability throughout the year. 
For the purposes of this analysis, expenditure includes 
cash outlay for goods and services as well as consumption of 
home-produced foods during the reporting period. Income in -
kind, gifts and barter were not included due to the quality of 
the data. Total expenditure was the sum of all expenditures 
and valued consumption from home-produced foods. All 
expenditure values were annualized since reporting periods 
varied for different survey items . The annualization used 
appropriate period weights; for example, weekly reported 
values were multiplied by 52 . 
Rental values for owner - occupied housing were not imputed 
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in the calculation of total expenditures. This may create 
differences between households who pay and report rent, 
compared with others . In Zambia more urban households 
reported rental housing costs than did rural households; 
hence, the reported total expenditures c ould be biased 
downwards in rural areas. However, on closer examination of 
the data, the bias was determined not to be a major problem . 
For those rural Zambians that did report housing costs, the 
average housing share was onl y about 3 percent. 
Because the REIS was undertaken during a one month period, 
June 1991, and not throughout the year, no seasonal variation 
was covered and June expenditures are assumed to be 
r epresentative of annual expenditure patter ns. The month o f 
June follows the maize harvest and is a time of relative 
abundance during the year . Since the survey occurred at this 
time, the reported expenditure levels (especially for food) 
may be somewhat higher than if the data were c ollected at 
other times of the year . Consumption of home produced 
c ommodities is an important factor in household expenditure 
(especially in rural areas), and therefore the seasonal nature 
o f the data may bias the calculated annual expenditure 
upwards . Using the current data there is no way to calculate 
the extent of this bias . 
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Demographi c Characteri stics of t he 1991 HEIS 
Tables 2 and 3 show the distribution of households by 
particular characteristics for the 1991 HEIS . The numbers and 
percentages of households are calculated using the weights 
developed b y Loughin et al. (1992). The distributions are 
further broken down by rural and urban location with 
approximately 70% of HEIS households in rural areas and 30% in 
urban areas. 
Household Size and Composition 
In Table 2 the average number of household members is 
broken down by age and sex groups. Urban households have a 
larger contribution to household size from adults age 18 - 55 
years than do rural households, but rural households have a 
larger con tribution to avera ge size by older a dults (56+ 
years). 
Table 2 Average number of hous ehold members by sex and age 
rou s 
Sex/Ag e Group Rural Urban All Zambia 
Females <5 0.4346 0.3650 0 . 4149 
Females 6 - 12 0.6066 0.6661 0.6234 
Fema les 13-17 0.3790 0 . 4523 0.3998 
Females 18-55 1.1850 1. 2964 1.2166 
Females 56+ 0.1208 0.0383 0.0974 
Males <5 0.4234 0 . 4752 0.4381 
Males 6-12 0 . 67 77 0.6009 0 . 6559 
Males 13-17 0 . 39 71 0 . 4183 0.4031 
Males 18-55 1. 0086 1. 3307 1. 1000 
Males 56+ 0.1409 0.0488 0 . 1148 
Total 5.3737 5.6920 5 . 4640 
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Table 3 shows how households are distributed by size class. 
Urban households have a much larger percentage of households 
with 9 or more members, and this is consistent with the larger 
average household size of urban households . 
Table 3 Distribution of households by number of members for 
rural , urban and all Zambia 
Number Rural Urban All Zambia 
of Member s Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
4 or Less 432913 42.23 151169 37.25 584082 40.82 
5-6 268034 26.15 101773 25.08 369807 25.84 
7-8 216765 21.15 84971 20.94 301736 21.09 
9-10 62301 6.08 50279 12.39 112580 7.87 
11 or More 45070 4.40 17648 4 .35 62718 4.38 
Total 1025083 100 . 00 405840 100.00 1430923 100 . 00 
Characteris tics o f the Household Bead 
The head of a household is generally the greatest income 
earner in the household and makes many of the household ' s 
expenditure decisions . Characteristics of the household head 
off er some insight into the ability of the household to 
generate income and to command resources. Table 4 shows that 
rural households are more likely to be headed by a woman than 
are urban households. This may be due to rural to urban 
migration of men in search of wage employment. Table 5 shows 
that rural households are much more likely to be headed by an 
older person and this is consistent with the greater number of 
older people living in rural areas . Table 6 shows that there 
are more single headed households in urban areas but more 
divorced headed households in rural areas. Table 7 shows that 
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self-employed headed households are more common in rural areas 
while wage and salaried employed headed households are more 
common in urban areas . 
Table 4 Distribution of households by gender of the household 
head for rural, urban, and all Zambia 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Total 
Rural Urban 
Number Percent Number Percent 
797270 77.78 339786 83.72 
227813 22.22 66054 16.28 
1025083 100 . 00 405840 100.00 
All Zambia 
Number 
1137056 
293867 
1430923 
Percent 
79.46 
20 .54 
100.00 
Table 5 Distribution of households by age group of the 
household head for rural , urban . and all Zambia 
Age Group 
18 -55 
56+ 
Total 
Rural Urban All Zambia 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
845240 82 . 46 384841 94.83 1230081 85 . 96 
179843 17.54 20999 5.14 200842 14.04 
1025083 100.00 405840 100.00 1430923 100.00 
Table 6 Distribution of households by marital status of the 
household head for rural, urban . and all Zambia 
Marital 
Status 
Single 
Married 
Widowed 
Divorced 
Total 
Rural Urban All Zambia 
Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
61067 5.96 51602 12.71 112669 7.87 
778196 75.92 308738 76.07 1086934 75.96 
81612 7.96 20303 5.00 101915 7 . 12 
104208 10.17 25197 6.21 129405 9 . 04 
1025083 100.00 405840 100.00 1430923 100 . 00 
Table 7 Distribution of households by employment status of the 
household head for rural , urban and all Zambia 
Employment Rural Urban All Zambia 
Status Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
N/ A 20997 2.05 6793 1.67 27790 1.94 
Self-
Employed 
Employee 
Unemployed 
Total 
831272 
138898 
33916 
1025083 
81.09 
13.55 
3.31 
100.00 
93644 
288404 
16999 
405840 
23 . 07 
71 .06 
4 . 19 
100 . 00 
924916 
427302 
50915 
1430923 
64 . 66 
29 . 86 
3 . 56 
100.00 
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CHAPTER 5. 
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
The concepts of poverty and income distribution are closely 
related because poverty is generally defined relative to some 
standard level of welfare. An analysis of the distribution of 
income as evidenced by the 1991 HEIS indicates how households 
are disbursed in the lower income ranges and the potential for 
progressive social welfare programs within the economy. 
Expenditures as a Proxy for Income 
Reported income in an expenditures and income survey such 
as the HEIS is often not a good measure of household income. 
Prior experience with expenditure and income data shows that 
many households are reluctant or unable to report income 
accurately. Poor households with irregular employment and 
various income sources may not know their actual incomes. 
Individuals that rely on the informal marketing sector may be 
reluctant to report their incomes accurately. Reported 
expenditure data tend to be more reliable and less prone to 
error t han income data. For most households, especially in 
developing countries, there are few household resources 
available for savings so expenditure data c losely approximate 
income . 
A particular limitation t o the use of consumption data for 
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an analysis of income distribution is differences in price 
levels. Respondents were asked how much of a commodity they 
consumed and how much they paid for it. In the case of home-
produced foods , the respondents were asked to value the foods 
themselves. Rural households were the largest consumers of 
home-produced foods and the values attributed to the foods 
cons umed may have reflected the wholesale price they would 
have expected to receive from a trader rather than the retail 
market price at which they would have had to purchase the 
food. It is also possible that the households reporting 
consumption of home-produced foods had not sold some 
commodities for a long period of time and were therefore 
unaware of current market prices . A detailed price analysis 
was conducted for maize products (Stampley, Jensen, and 
Johnson, 1992) but not for other commodities due to limited 
data , non - standard unit measures and t he time and effort 
involved in such an undertaking. The food values reported by 
households were assumed to be accurate and representative of 
local prices for the purposes of this analysis. No 
adjustments were made for differences in prices levels across 
regions. 
The Lorenz Funct ion and Gi n i Coef f i c i ent 
The distribution of income within a population is often 
described using two related concepts, the Lorenz function and 
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the Gini coefficient. The Lorenz function describes the 
cumulative share of the total population's income accruing to 
households a s hou seholds become wealthier. The Gini 
coefficient is a summary statistic, ranging from 0 to 1, that 
is useful for comparing inequality in income distribution for 
two or more populations. 
Creating Deciles 
Before the Lorenz function could be estimated the 
hous eholds were ranked from poorest to wealthiest in terms of 
hous ehold expenditure and then divided into ten equal groups. 
The ten equal groups are referred to as deciles, with the 
first decile being composed of households with the lowest 
household expenditures and the tenth decile being those 
households with the highest expenditures. 
Deciles were created in the following manner: 
Ranki ng of Households All of the households in the 
survey were ranked according to the value their expenditure, 
with the household with the lowest value being ranked first 
and the household with the highest value ranked last . 
Dividing the Populati on Deciles were drawn by assigning 
those households that make up the poorest (in terms of 
household expenditure} one tenth of the sample to the first 
decile. The next poorest one tenth of households were 
assigned to the second decile , and so on until the wealthiest 
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one tenth of households were assigned to the tenth decile. 
These deciles are called here "household deciles" . 
A set of individual expenditures was created as well to 
describe the distribution of expenditures among individuals. 
The same technique as above was used except that individuals 
were ranked by the per capita expenditure of the household to 
which they belong . Per capita expenditure is simply the 
household expenditure divided by the number of people living 
in that household with no adjustment made for household 
composition. Deciles contain equal numbers of individuals 
rather than households . These deciles are called here 
"individual deciles". 
Decile means were calculated as the arithmetic average of 
the values of the variable in question for that decile . 
Esti mati ng the Lorenz Functi on 
A discrete Lorenz function was estimated using the deciles 
as constructed above. Household expenditures were summed 
across each dec ile and the divided by the sum of household 
expenditures for the entire data set to yield the share of 
total, national expenditure going to that decile . The Lorenz 
function is then the running total of the decile shares. The 
same process was used for estimating the individual Lorenz 
function . 
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Estimating the Gini Coeffici ent 
The calculation of the Gini coefficients was independent of 
any decile designation and was calculated from continuous 
valued data. The Gini coefficient was calculated as presented 
by Fei, Ranis and Kwo (1979) using the following technique. 
where 
Gy = ot.µ.y - 1S 
ot. 2/n , 
1S (n+l)/n , and 
µ.Y = 61Y1+6iY2+ .. . +6nYn ' where 
Y1sy2s ... sy0 and 
61=1, 62=2, . . . , 60 =n. 
In this formula y is either the household expenditure of the 
iili household or the per capita expenditure of the iili 
individual, and n is the number of households or individuals 
in the population. 6 is the income rank of the iili household 
or individual. 
Results 
Table 8 shows the share of national expenditure by 
household and individual decile groupings. The household 
shares indicate a higher degree of inequality than do the 
individual shares due to the effect of household size . Larger 
households tend to be wealthier in absolute terms but poorer 
in per capita terms than do smaller households. Therefore, 
the use of household level expenditure overstates inequality. 
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The Gini coefficient for household level expenditure 
distri bution is .4586 while that for individual level 
expenditure distribution is .4354. Both per capita and 
household expenditure showed a great amount of variance with 
CV's (CV=(std/mean) *lOO) of 696% and 285% respectively. 
Table 8 Share 
Decile 
1 (lowest) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 (highest ) 
of national expenditure 
Households 
Cumulative 
Share Share 
. 01 76 . 01 76 
. 0299 . 0474 
.0393 . 0868 
. 0485 .1353 
. 0598 .1951 
.0747 .2698 
.0967 .3666 
.1244 . 4909 
. 1665 . 6574 
.3426 1.0000 
G=.4586 
Note: deciles are either household or 
by decile groupings 
Individuals 
Cumulative 
Share Share 
. 0214 .0214 
.0344 .0557 
.0429 .0986 
.0534 .1521 
.0638 .2159 
. 0763 .2922 
.0933 .3855 
.1177 . 5032 
.1564 . 6596 
.3404 1.0000 
G=.4354 
individual 
The Zambian economy shows a strong differential between 
rural and urban expenditures and the distribution of 
expenditures . Table 9 shows that both household and per 
capita expenditures are about twice as high in urban as in 
rural areas . 
Table 9 Mean annual household and per capita expenditures by 
rural, urban and all of Zambia 
Expenditure Rural Urban All Zambia 
Household 42,540 91,030 56,293 
Per Capita 7 . 916 15.993 10,302 
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Table 10 shows the share of rural expenditure by household 
and individual deciles. Households show substantially greater 
inequality than do individuals, again due to the effect of 
household size. The Gini coefficient for rural household 
level expenditure distribution is .4410 while that for 
individual level expenditure distribution is .3985. 
Table 10 Share of rural expenditures by decile groupings 
Households Individuals 
Cumulative Cumulative 
Decile Share Shares Share Shares 
1 (lowest) .0207 .0207 .0248 .0248 
2 .0338 .0544 .0387 .0635 
3 .0439 .0984 .0492 .1127 
4 .0531 .1515 .0573 . 1700 
5 .0630 .2145 .0678 .2378 
6 .0748 . 2894 .0812 .3190 
7 .0907 .3800 .0947 .4137 
8 .1161 .4961 .1190 .5327 
9 .1574 .6536 .1556 .6883 
10 (highest) .3464 1.0000 . 3117 1. 0000 
G=.4410 G=.3985 
Note: deciles are either household or individual 
Table 11 shows the share of urban expenditure by household 
and individual deciles . Unlike rural and national expenditure 
distributions, the urban expenditure distributions show 
greater inequality at the individual level than at the 
household level. While urban households show no particular 
trend in household size across household deciles, larger 
households tend to be poorer in per capita terms and therefore 
their members are more likely to fall into the lower 
individual deciles. The Gini coefficient for urban household 
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Table 11 Share of u r ban expenditure by decile groupings 
Households Individuals 
Cumulative Cumulative 
Decile Share Shares Share Shares 
1 (lowest ) .0261 .0261 .0266 .0266 
2 .0404 .0665 .0401 . 0668 
3 . 0522 .1187 .0484 .1152 
4 . 0639 .1826 .0573 .1726 
5 .0752 .2579 .0667 .2393 
6 .0876 .3454 .0804 . 3197 
7 .1016 .4470 .0934 .4132 
8 .1225 .5695 .1158 .5289 
9 .1487 .7182 .1534 .6823 
10 (highest ) .2818 1. 0000 .3177 1.0000 
G=.3619 G=.3964 
Note: deciles are either household or individual 
level expenditure distribution is .3619 while that for 
individual level expenditure distribution is .3964. 
Conclusi on 
The Gini coefficients show that there is a great amount of 
inequality in the distribution of expenditures in Zambia. The 
distribution of expenditures among households is more unequal 
than among individuals in rural areas due to the effect of 
household size. Urban households show more inequality among 
individuals because larger households tend to be poorer in per 
capita terms. There is a greater degree of inequality in the 
distribution of expenditures in rural areas than in urban 
areas. 
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CHAPTER 6 . 
MEASURES OF POVERTY 
Before one can begin to describe the characteristics of 
"poor households", it is necessary to first define exactly 
which households are "poor". To this end, there must be some 
assertion of a measure of welfare by which households can be 
rated . A cut-off point value of the measure of welfare can 
then be established that signifies that those households below 
the cut-off are deficient in the measure of welfare and those 
households above the cut-off are sufficient. This cut-off 
point is referred to as the poverty datum line (PDL) . 
The primary objective of this study is to describe the 
characteristics of food deficit households. Therefore , the 
measure to be used to compare the welfare status of different 
households will be food consumption as indicated by food 
expenditures. This chapter deals with how the PDL was 
established and its implications for identifying food poor 
households. 
After a discussion of the concept of a poverty datum line , 
the reader is carried through the steps and the rationale of 
the process used to create the PDL used for this study . 
First, a set of weights was constructed that was used to 
standardize food expenditures to make them directly comparable 
between households . Then, two PDLs were established by 
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defining the 20% of the population with the lowest 
standardized food expenditures as the "extreme poverty group" 
and the 50% of the population with the lowest standardized 
food expenditures as the "poverty group" . Finally , the 
poverty definitions , as established for the use of this study, 
are compared with alternative poverty definitions to examine 
the usefulness of other measures of welfare in identifying 
food deficit households. 
Poverty Datum Line 
A meaningful poverty level, or poverty datum line (PDL ) , 
provides a criterion for defining members of the population 
that are living in poverty, and can be used to monitor 
fluctuations in the incidence, prevalence, and depth of 
poverty . Those households or individuals defined to be in 
poverty have incomes less than this reference amount . In 
practice, the choice of a PDL is a subject of considerable 
debate. Using an absolute measure, such as a minimum food 
consumption level or market basket of goods to ensure 
survival, is one approach. This requires some agreement about 
the physical requirements for the selected living standard, 
and good information about household access to goods and 
services that meet the basic needs. Since the HEIS was 
undertaken in a one month period, it likely does not fully 
represent the true consumption pattern over the entire year, 
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and therefore does not lend itself to define an absolute 
poverty line. 
One could also employ a relative measure of poverty that 
defines "poor" relative to the general living standard of the 
country. Relative measures are typically defined in terms of 
some proportion of the population that receives the lowest 
incomes. While such a PDL is useful for describing the 
characteristics of the poorer segment of a population, it is 
based on strictly subjective criteria and does not allow for 
any change in the incidence of poverty over time. 
The PDL defined for this study is a relative measure. 
Since the objective of this study is to describe the 
characteristics of poor households, a relative measure will 
suffice. This may present a problem should future researchers 
wish to compare changes in poverty over time. In that case, 
the value of the food expenditure below which households have 
been defined to be poor in this study could be adjusted for 
inflation and used to define poverty in a future study. 
The PDL presented here was established by first determining 
a set of scales for adjusting for household size and 
composition that expresses each household member as a fraction 
of an adult. These were estimated based on the food 
expenditures data. Next, deciles were constructed based on 
per adult equivalent food expenditures (the standardized food 
expenditure measure) . Those households that fell in the first 
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t wo deci l e s were defined to be in the "extreme poverty" group 
and those households that fell into the bottom five deciles 
were defined to be in the "poverty " group . 
Per adult equivalent food expenditures were used as the 
meas ure of welfare of households because food provides for a 
basic need a nd rep resents a major s hare of the budgets of poor 
Zambian hous eholds. This use of per adult equivalent food 
expenditures means that the definition of poverty presented 
here should be thought of as " food poverty", that is a 
shortfall in food consumption (expenditure) , and not 
necessarily a shortfall in income. 
Adjusting for Household Size a.nd Composition 
The 1991 HEIS expenditure data are aggregated by 
households. Before a meaningful comparison of nutritional 
welfare can be made across households, food expenditures must 
be converted to standard units. The most direct method for 
standardizing food expenditures is to simply divide the 
expenditure of a household by the number of persons in that 
household. This approach is limited though, for comparisons 
of household welfare because it does not allow for the 
differing needs of adults and children. The level of food 
expenditure necessary to properly nourish a child is less than 
that necessary for an adult, but a per capita standardization 
gives each t he same weight. To address this issue a set of 
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weights was calculated that expresses each member as a 
fraction of an adult. The sum of the weights represents the 
number of equivalent adults in the household. Household food 
expenditure divided by the number of equivalent adults in the 
household (per adult equivalent food expenditure ) provides a 
measure of nutritional welfare that is more readily comparable 
across households. 
There are s everal methods of calculating adult equivalence 
scales , each with its own strengths and weaknesses. The 
method u s ed here closely follows that outlined by Goungetas 
and Johnson (1992) in their work on U.S. food stamp program 
parameters (the reader is referred to Goungetas and Johnson 
for a more thorough and formal presentation of the method used 
here) . This method is rooted in the estimation of Engel 
relationships with commodity specific and income scales as 
first put forward by Prais and Houthakker (1955). The 
advantage of this method is that it allows for commodity 
specific equivalence scales. Since the variable of interest 
in this study is food expenditures, the specific commodity on 
which the equivalence scales are based is food. 
Esti mati on of the Equi valence Scales 
Engel functions were estimated for total food expenditure 
using the composition of the household, in terms of age 
distribution and sex and age distribution. No consideration 
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was given to economies of scale in larger households . Five 
different age groups were defined: 
1. Children less than six years old. 
2. Children from six to less than thirteen years of 
age. 
3. Teenagers from thirteen to less than eighteen years 
of age . 
4. Adults from eighteen to less than 56 years of age. 
5. Adults fifty six years of age or older. 
The following Engel functions were estimated: 
Linear: Ci=Ei=i-5 7Tc[I\:i{v+ (y/ni) }l (1) 
Semilogarithmic: Ci=Ei=•-5 7Tc[I\:i{v+ln (y/ni) }l (2 ) 
Double - Logarithmic: Ci=Ei=i-5 7Tg [ngi(y/ ni)b] (3 ) 
Before the Engel functions could be estimated, per capita 
food expenditure was regressed on per capita income to 
generate starting values: 
where 
~/~ a + b (~/~) for the linear model, 
~/ni a + b ln (y/ni) for the semilog model, 
ln ( ~/ni ) a + b ln (y/ni) for the double log model, 
~ is the food expenditure for the i~ household, 
ni is the number of members of the i~ household, 
a is the intercept term, 
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b is the slope coefficient , 
Y; is the income of the i lh household, 
and ln is the natural logarithmic operator. 
v was calculated as the ratio of a/b. 
Next, each of the five ng are estimated by regressing food 
expenditure on 
nci [ v+ (y;/n;)] for the linear model, 
nc; [v+ln (y;/n;)] for the semilog model 
Ilg; [ (y;/n;) b] for the double-log model 
where ng; is the age specific or age/sex specific number of 
members in the ilh household, nc is the age group or age/ sex 
group specific parameter to be estimated, and v, Yi• b, and n; 
are as defined above. Each estimation is performed using 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 
The estimation method used in estimating equations (1), (2) 
and (3) is a nonlinear algorithm available in SAS (Statistical 
Analysis System) . Equations (1) through (3) were estimated 
using PROC NLIN in SAS using the Gauss -Marquardt convergence 
method. The OLS estimates of ~ were used as initial values 
for respective coefficients in the PROC NLIN procedure. 
The adult equivalence scales were calculated as the 
parameter estimate for each of the nc's divided by the 
parameter estimate for n4 (the 18 -56 year old , adult group ) in 
the case of the age specific scales , and n~ (18-56 year old 
males) in the case of the age/sex specific scales. This 
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assigned an adult equivalence of 1.00 to an adult (18 - 56 years 
old) in the case of the age specific scales, and an adult 
equivalence of 1.00 to an adult male in the case of the 
age/ sex specific scales . 
Resul ts All equations converged automatically . The 
adult equivalence scales are presented in Table 12. The set 
of equivalence scales used for this paper were from the linear 
model. 
The linear set of scales was chosen because it appeared to 
be the most "reasonable" of all of the sets of weights. The 
linear scales show an unusually low weight for the 56+ 
Table 12 Adult equivalence scales for each 
groups and age/sex groups 
Age Group 
0-5 years 
6-12 years 
13 - 17 years 
18 - 55 years 
56+ years 
Age/Sex Group 
males 0 - 5 
males 6-12 
males 13-17 
males 18-55 
males 56+ 
females 0 -5 
females 6 - 12 
females 13 - 17 
females 18-55 
females 56+ 
Linear Semi log 
Model Model 
0 . 4681 0.3650 
0 . 6627 0.4344 
0.7349 0.3766 
1 . 0000 1.0000 
0.4247 0 . 8582 
0.5742 
0.5790 
0.9502 
1.0000 
1. 7215 
0.2556 
0 . 7538 
0.4995 
0.9595 
0.0248 
0.2916 
0.3179 
0.4147 
1. 0000 
0.8417 
0.3930 
0.4743 
0.2710 
0.6896 
0 . 6959 
of the five age 
Double-Log 
Model 
0.4259 
0.6189 
0 . 6118 
1.0000 
0 . 7519 
0.5667 
0.5937 
0.9401 
1.0000 
1 . 6358 
0 . 0260 
0.0725 
0.4786 
0.9320 
0.0194 
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years age group but, the semilogarithmic and double-
logarithmic scales contain the unusual feature that 13-17 year 
olds are weighted less than the 6-12 year olds. Considering 
that there is a larger proportion of the population that is in 
the 6-17 year age range (38%) than the 56+ age range (4% ) , it 
was felt that the linear scales would more accurately 
represent the needs of the population. 
The semilogarithmic function has the theoretical advantage 
of allowing for a decreasing propensity to consume food at 
higher income levels. Whereas, the food budget share does 
decrease among households, the HEIS data still show large food 
budget shares among the top income groups. This may be a 
feature of the survey design of the HEIS or it may be true 
that food continues to be the most important expenditure for 
Zambian households at all levels of income. In either case, 
the additional feature of decreasing propensity to consume 
food at higher income levels allowed by the semilogarithmic 
function does not provide an improved description of food 
expenditure over the linear function. 
Deciles 
The measure of welfare used in this analysis is per adult 
equivalent food expenditure (as defined in the above section). 
Deciles were created in the same manner as described in 
chapter 5 except that households have been ranked by per adult 
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equivalent food expenditure. Again, the first decile is 
composed of households with the lowest values of per adult 
equivalent food expenditure and the tenth decile is composed 
of those households with the highest values of per adult 
equivalent food expenditure . The deciles will be referred to 
in tables as "Per Adult Deciles". 
Determining the PDL 
Two poverty lines were drawn, defining the poorest 20% of 
households as the "extreme poverty" group, and the poorest 50% 
of households as the "poverty " group (Table 13). The extreme 
poverty group is then a subset of the poverty group. This use 
of a relative poverty line is justifiable in the absence of 
data upon which to derive an absolute measure of poverty 
(which, in the case of the 1991 HEIS is the lack of 
standardized measures for foods) . 
Two poverty lines were drawn to examine the characteristics 
of the extreme poor, or destitute, and the poor. This use of 
two poverty definitions allows comparison of the depth of 
poverty among groups . The use of two poverty definitions may 
also be useful in determining the administrative feasibility 
of a poverty reduction program. A poverty definition that 
includes a very large percentage of the population may be of 
little use if the government is unable, financially or 
administratively, to provide services and transfers to that 
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many households. The government may choose, instead, to 
concentrate on the poorest of the poor. An extreme poverty 
group also provides a "bulls-eye" for targeted programs, 
whereby any leakage of benefits to wealthier households still 
go to relatively poorer households. 
The per adult equivalent food expenditure cut points for 
defining the extreme poverty group and the poverty group were 
set at the highest value of per adult equivalent food 
expenditure for the second and fifth deciles, respectively. 
Based on these measures the extreme poverty group had per 
adult equivalent annual food expenditures no greater than 
Table 13 Maximum and mean per adult food expenditures 
(Kwacha) by per adult food expenditure deciles 
Per Adult 
Decile 
1 (lowest) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Maximum Per Adult Mean Per Adult 
Food Expenditure Food Expenditure 
3471 . 16 2619 . 06 
4581.78 4022.25 t extreme poverty 
5579.52 5084.56 
6487.06 6053.94 
7848.14 7138.65 t poverty 
9302.41 8485.03 
11050.02 10102.96 
14270 . 06 12477.55 
19877.15 16673.79 9 
10 (highest) 162500.65 34064.62 
K4582, and the poverty group had per adult equivalent annual 
food expenditures no greater than K7848. These poverty groups 
should be thought of as defining the "food poor" instead of 
those households that are poor in terms of income. As used 
here poverty is synonymous with food deficit . 
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Comparison of Alternative Poverty Measures 
Poverty is defined here in terms of per adult equivalent 
food expenditures in order to identify those households 
suffering from food deficits. An advantage of this approach, 
over that of using food shares or some measure that includes 
non-food expenditures as well (such as total expenditures } , is 
that it includes in the extreme poverty and poverty groups 
households that are in a position where they are obliged to 
meet large non-food expenditures and households that happened 
to report a large non-food expenditure during the survey 
period. Thes e households would have lower per adult 
equivalent food expenditures but also lower food shares and 
higher total expenditures. It may be assumed from the low per 
adult equivalent food expenditures that these households are 
food deficit. All such households will be included in the 
poverty groups defined here but may not be included if 
households were ranked by total expenditure or food share . 
The natu re of the poverty lines established here invite 
comparison with rankings based on other criteria . The reader 
will recall that two poverty lines based on per adult 
equivalent food expenditure have been set to define the 
extreme poverty group and poverty group at 20% and 50% of the 
population , respectively . Would ranking households by other 
criteria misiden tify some of thes e food insecure households ? 
Alternative ranking schemes included ranking by per capita 
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expenditure, household expenditure, and per capita food 
expenditure. Poverty lines for these alternative rankings 
were also set at the poorest 20% and the poorest 50% of 
households, for the "extreme poverty" and the "poverty" groups 
respectively , thereby allowing for direct comparisons of all 
poverty definitions. The poverty lines based on per adult 
equivalent food expenditures are assumed to define "truly" 
poor hous eholds. A cross tabulation of the alternative 
poverty lines indicates what percentage of truly poor 
households would be defined as poor by the alternative 
definition and what percentage of truly not poor households 
would be defined as not poor by the alternative definition. 
Measures of Misclassificat ion 
Misclassification tables, such as Table 14 below, are 
useful in interpreting the accuracy of targeting indicators. 
The targeting indicator plays the role of the "alternative 
indicator " and the poverty line criterion defines "true 
poverty". 
There are a number of useful measures that can be 
calculated from a misclassification table. Sensitivity and 
specificity are two measures of the validity of targeting 
indicators . Sensitivity is defined as the probability of a 
household being categorized as poor by the targeting indicator 
given the household is truly poor. Specificity is defined as 
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Table 14 A typical 2x2 misclassification table 
Poverty as Classified True Poverty 
by Alternative Indicator Yes No 
Yes a b 
No c d 
Source: Hennekens and Buring (1987 ) 
Note: cell values are expressed in numbers of households 
Sensitivity= a /(a+c) 
Error of Exclusion= c/ (a+c) 
Specificity= d/ (b+d) 
Error of Inclusion= b /(b+d) 
Positive Predictive Value a /(a+b ) 
Negative Predictive Value= d /( c+d) 
the probability of a household being categorized as not poor 
by the targeting indicator given that the household is truly 
not poor. 
Ideally, a targeting indicator should be highly sensitive 
and highly specific but in practice there is of ten a trade off 
between the t wo measures. The relative effectiveness of two 
targeting indicators may be assessed by adding the sensitivity 
and specificity, preferring the indicator with the larger sum . 
A highly sensitive test will usually result in a large number 
of households that are not truly poor being categorized as 
poor. A highly specific test will usually result in a large 
number of households that are truly poor being categorized as 
not poor . 
Error of exclusion and error of inclusion are useful f or 
designing a set of criteria by which to judge the eligibility 
of a household for participation in a poverty reduction 
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program. A targeting indicator that has low error of 
exclusion but not necessarily a low error of inclusion should 
be used for the initial screening. The point here is to err 
on the side of caution and include any households that may 
qualify for the program while excluding households that almost 
certainly do not qualify. In subsequent screenings a low 
error of inclusion is important to reduce the number of 
households who are not truly poor from remaining in the 
program. 
Positive predictive value is defined as the probability 
that a household is truly poor given it has been categorized 
as poor by the targeting indicator. Negative predictive value 
is defined as the probability that a househol d is truly not 
poor given that it has been categorized as not poor by the 
targeting indicator. Highly sensitive targeting indicators 
reduce the likelihood that a truly not poor household will be 
categorized as poor and therefore will have a greater negative 
predictive value . Likewise, a highly specific targeting 
indicator reduces the likelihood that a truly poor household 
will be categorized as not poor and therefore will have a 
greater positive predictive value. 
Results 
Tables 15 and 16 present misclassification tables for the 
alternative poverty measures. The cells in Tables 15 and 16 
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report percentages of all households rather than numbers of 
households to facilitate the reader's understanding of the 
results. 
A cross-tabulation of alternative definitions of the 
extre me poverty group (lowest 20%) indicates that the rankings 
by household expenditure misclassifies more households than a 
ranking by per capita expenditure or per capita food 
expenditure. Table 15 compares the per adult equivalent food 
expenditure defined extreme poverty group with the household 
expenditure defined extreme poverty group. Ranking by 
household expenditure misclassifies 45.55% of truly extremely 
poor households as not extremely poor, and 11.40% of truly not 
extremely poor households as extremely poor. Table 15 also 
compares the per adult equivalent food expenditure defined 
extreme poverty group with the per capita expenditure defined 
extreme poverty group. Ranking by per capita expenditure 
misclassifies 19.48% of truly extremely poor households as not 
extremely poor and 4.90% of truly not extremely poor 
households as extremely poor. Table 15 also shows the results 
of comparing the per adult equivalent food expenditure defined 
extreme poverty group with the per capita food expenditure 
defined extreme poverty group. Ranking by per capita food 
expenditure misclassifies 8.10% of truly extremely poor 
households as not extremely poor and 2.03% of truly not 
extremely poor households as extremely poor. 
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Table 16 compares the per adult equivalent food expenditure 
defined poverty group with the household expenditure defined 
poverty group. Ranking by household expenditure misclassifies 
26.68% of truly poor households as not poor and 26.62% of 
truly not poor households as poor. Table 16 also compares the 
per adult equivalent food expenditure defined poverty group 
with the per capita expenditure defined poverty group. 
Ranking by per capita expenditure misclassifies 19.48% of 
truly poor households as not poor and 4.90% of truly not poor 
households as poor . Table 16 compares the per adult 
equivalent food expenditure defined poverty group with the per 
capita food expenditure defined poverty group. This ranking 
misclassifies 5.89% of truly poor households as not poor and 
Table 15 Misclassification of 
poverty definitions 
extreme poverty by alternative 
Extreme Poverty as Classified 
by Household Expenditure 
Yes 
No 
sensitivity= .5445 
specificity=.8860 
Extreme Poverty as Classified 
by Per Capita Expenditure 
Yes 
No 
sensitivity= . 8052 
specificity= .9510 
Extreme Poverty as Classified 
by Per Capita Food Expenditure 
Yes 
No 
sensitivity=.9190 
specificity=.9797 
True Extreme Poverty 
Yes No 
10.86% 9 . 13% 
9.09% 70.92% 
16.06% 
3.89% 
18.34% 
1 . 62% 
3 . 92% 
76.12% 
1.63% 
78.42% 
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5.85% of truly not poor households as poor. 
These comparisons show that household expenditure is a poor 
indicator of the food insecurity of a household. Household 
expenditure as a defining variable demonstrates low 
sensitivity and specificity . Per capita expenditure is 
remarkably accurate in terms of specificity but sensitivity 
for the extreme poverty group is low. Per capita food 
expenditure as a defining variable most closely approximates 
poverty groups defined by per adult equivalent food 
expenditure of the three alternative measures. All three 
alternative measures show lower sensitivity for the extreme 
poverty groups than the poverty groups and higher specificity 
for the poverty groups than for the extreme poverty groups. 
Table 16 Misclassification 
def init ions 
of poverty by alternative 
Poverty as Classified 
by Household Expenditure 
Yes 
No 
sensitivity= .7332 
specificity=.7338 
Poverty as Classified 
by Per Capita Expenditure 
Yes 
No 
sensitivity= .8821 
specificity= . 8825 
Poverty as Classified 
by Per Capita Food Expenditure 
Yes 
No 
sensitivity=. 9411 
specificity=.9415 
True 
Yes 
36 . 65% 
13.34% 
44.10% 
5.89% 
47.05% 
2.95% 
Poverty 
No 
13 .31% 
36.70% 
5 . 88% 
44.13% 
2.95% 
47. 08% 
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CHAPTER 7. 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF POVERTY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POOR 
The 1991 HEIS contained much information about the 
demographic composition, geographic location, and income 
sources of households. Many of these variables have been 
shown to be highly associated with poverty in developing 
countries (Kennedy, 1992) . This chapter presents a variable 
by variable analysis of each variable's association with the 
poverty groups defined in the previous chapter. 
Each of these variables is a potential candidate for use as 
a targeting indicator . To assess the appropriateness of each 
of the variables as a targeting indicator, three different 
types of analyses are used. A set of decomposable poverty 
indices were calculated that indicate which groups within the 
variables have higher incidence of poverty , and which groups 
contain the most poor households. A decile analysis describes 
the distribution of characteristics at different levels of per 
adult equivalent food expenditure . A misclassification 
analysis , conducted with respect to targeting to particular 
groups within variables, gauges the effectiveness of 
particular targeting indicators in terms of reaching the poor 
and eliminating the nonpoor. The results from the 
misclassification analysis has implications for the cost 
effectiveness of targeting by a particular indicator. 
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Variable s 
The set of variables examined in this chapter are as 
follows: 
Rural/Urban Locati on : This designation is based on the 
administrative definitions of Census Supervisory Areas (CSAs ) 
established for the 1990 Census of Population, Housing and 
Agriculture. The rural / urban status of each household is 
based on the designation of the CSA in which it is located. 
Provinces : This indicates the province of Zambia in 
which the household is located . There are nine provinces: 
Eastern, Central, Copperbelt, Luapula, Lusaka, Northern, 
North- West ern, Southern , and Western. 
Household Size : This is the number of members in the 
household at the time of the HEIS. The household size in 
equivalent adults is the number of members in a household at 
the time of the HEIS after each member has been weighted by 
his/her age specific adult equivalence scale . 
Dependency Ratio: This was calculated as the number of 
children (less than 18 years of age) in a household divided by 
the number of adults (18 years old or older) in that 
household . This is a measure of the burden of the household 
in providing for children. 
Percentage of Preschoolers Per Household: This was 
calcula ted as the ratio of the number of children less than 
six years old in a household to the total number of people in 
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the household . 
Gender of the household head : This is whether the 
person who is identified as the head of the household is a man 
or a woman. 
Age Class of the Household Head: This may be either 18 -
55 years old or 56+ years old. Younger househo ld heads 
describes household heads in the 18 -55 years age range, and 
older household head describes heads in the 56+ years age 
range. All HEIS households had a head in one of these two age 
groups . 
Educational Level of the Household Head: This includes 
five des ignations : 1) no schooling (never attended any sort of 
formal schooling) , 2) primary only (left school before 
entering secondary school), 3) secondary only (completed s ome 
or all secondary schooling but did not go on to attend any 
higher eduction), 4 ) higher education (completed some higher 
education or graduated from an insti t ution o f higher 
education), 5) not applicable (a bit of a mystery , but it 
probably means not available ) . 
Marital Status of the Household Head: This includes 
four designations: 1 ) Single (never married at the time of the 
HEIS ) , 2) Married (in a conjugal relationship, however 
informal , at the time of the HEIS ) , 3) Widowed (former spouse 
had died by the time of the HEIS ), 4) Divorced (no longer 
living with former spouse at the time of the HEIS) . 
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Employment Status of the Household Head : This includes 
four designations : 1) self-employed (employed in an enterprise 
that is owned by the same individual at the time of the HEIS ) , 
2) employee (employed in an enterprise which is owned by 
another individual at the time of the HEIS) , 3 ) unemployed 
(not employed at the time of the HEIS), 4) not applicable 
(e.g . retired or disabled at the time of the HEIS) . 
Sources of Income : This is the number of different 
sectors from which the members of a household receive income. 
The different sectors are salaried or wage employment, 
agriculture, manufacturing and repairs, trading and marketing, 
food and catering, informal sundry services, other sources, 
and mining and quarrying. 
Poverty Indices 
Poverty indices measure the incidence and severity of 
poverty for a population. These measures are useful in 
comparing poverty among two or more populations. The 
aggregate poverty measures presented in this study were 
calculated using the method first proposed by Foster, Greer, 
and Thorbecke (1984) and known as FGT poverty measures. The 
advantage of FGT poverty measures is that the measure of 
poverty for the entire population may be decomposed by 
subpopulations, so that the sum of the subpopulation poverty 
measures is the poverty measure for the population as a whole. 
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Using this technique it is possible to compare the incidence 
and severity of poverty between subpopulations as wel l as 
examine which subpopulations contribute the most to total 
poverty. Subpopulations are referred to in this paper as 
groups. 
All poverty measures are calculated with respect to the two 
poverty datum lines defined in the previous chapter and the 
results for each poverty group are reported . 
The FGT poverty measure, Pa, is calculated as follows: 
Where 
P a=l/njza Ei= l-qj ( z - f) "' 
z is the poverty line, 
a is a parameter that determines the type of index to 
be calculated, 
f; is the per adult food expenditure of the ilh 
household whose per adult equivalent food expenditure 
is below the poverty line, 
ni is the number of households in the jib group, 
and the summation takes place over those households whose per 
adult equivalent expenditure is below the poverty line 
( i=l, ... ,q). 
The parameter a is a measure of poverty aversion with 
different a values weighting the depth of poverty of each 
household differently. A value of 0 weights all poor 
households equally, yielding the proportion of households with 
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income below the poverty level in a given group . An a value 
of 1 gives the income gap; a measure of the depth of poverty 
but with no greater emphasis placed on poorer households. An 
a value greater than one puts more weight on poorer households 
by increasing exponentially the summed value of the distance 
between z and fi. For this analysis an a value of 2 was used 
which is a common practice in the analysis of poverty in 
developing countries . 
This index can be readily decomposed in order to compare 
the incidence of poverty among different groups. The 
proportion of poor in each group was simply calculated as 
nqj /n;, where nqi is the number of poor households in the j lh 
group and ~ is the number of households in the jlh group. The 
percentage contribution to total poverty was calculated as 
follows: 
100 (n/n) (Pj/P,J 
Where 
n . 
J 
is the number of households in the jlh group; 
n is the number of households in the entire sample; 
p j 
"' 
is the Pa measure for the jlh group; 
pa is the Poe measure for the entire sample; 
Rur al and Urban Popul ations 
Zambia ' s economy is highly dualistic with a modern/urban 
sector and a traditional / rural sector. The urban sector tends 
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to have much higher wages and access to subsidized commodities 
and government provided services. 
As Table 17 shows, the food poverty level i s relatively 
high in rural areas regardless of which poverty datum line is 
used. The upper PDL indicates that 59% of rural households 
are in poverty compared to 28% of urban households. Using the 
extreme poverty datum line the difference is even more 
remarkable with 25% of rural households in poverty but only 6% 
o f urban households. The rural population of Zambia has the 
vast majority of food deficit households, and a higher 
incidence and level of food poverty than do urban areas. 
Table 17 Poverty levels by rural , urban and all of Zambia 
Level of Contribution Average Per Adult Poor in 
Location Poverty to Total Poverty E~enditure by Poor Each Grou2 
Extreme Pov erty {percent) (Kwacha ) {percent) 
Rural 0 .8269 95.78 3271 . 22 25.45 
Urban 0.0920 4.22 3827.31 6 . 08 
All Zambia 0.6185 100.00 3319.28 19.95 
Poverty 
Rural 3.0684 88 .39 4855.82 58.80 
Urban 1. 01 75 11. 61 5680.63 27.60 
All Zambia 2.4867 100 .00 4985.07 49.95 
Table 18 shows the percent of households by rural and urban 
location, both within decile (first t wo columns) and within 
location among deciles (last two columns). It can be seen 
that the lower deciles are made up of mostly rural households 
while the upper deciles are predominantly urban. 
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Table 18 Percent of households by 
Per Adult 
Deciles 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Deciles Distributed 
by Rural and Urban 
Location 
Rural Urban 
96.11 3.89 
86.59 13.41 
82.54 17.46 
78 . 74 21.26 
77.78 22.22 
67.75 32 . 25 
73.25 26.75 
57.39 42.61 
56.09 43.91 
40.34 59 . 66 
rural/urban location 
Rural and Urban 
Location Distributed 
by Deciles 
Rural Urban 
13.41 1 . 37 
12 .03 4.71 
11. 51 6 .15 
10.96 7 . 48 
10 .94 7 .89 
9.45 11.36 
10.20 9.41 
8.04 15. 07 
7.79 15.40 
5.66 21.16 
A misclassification analysis was performed using rural 
location of the household as the alternative poverty 
definition. Targeting extremely poor households by rural 
location is highly sensitive (sensitivity=.91) and has a l ow 
error of exclusion (error of exclusion=.09). The error of 
inclusion is fairly high though (error of inclusion=.67 ) , so 
targeting to all rural households would result in many not 
poor households being included in the target group. 
Targeting poor households by rural location, again, is 
highly sensitive (sensitivity=.84) and has a low error of 
exclusion (error of exclusion=.16). The error of inclusion i s 
also fairly high (error of inclusion=.59) , so targeting to all 
rural households would result in many not poor households 
being included in the target group. Targeting to rural 
locations though, would exclude those 28% of urban households 
that are poor from being included in the target group. 
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Provinces 
Households in the Eastern, Luapula, and Southern provinces 
contribute the most to the number of households nationally 
that fall below the extreme poverty datum line (Table 19 ) . 
Eastern, Luapula, North-Western and Southern provinces all 
have disproportionately large percentages of extremely poor 
households. The depth of poverty is greatest in households in 
Eastern, Luapula and Southern provinces for those households 
falling below the extreme PDL. 
Table 19 Poverty levels by province 
Level of Contribution 
Province Povertv to Total Pover ty 
Ext reme Poverty (percent ) 
Central 0.6574 12.15 
Copperbelt 0.1644 2.68 
Eastern 1.4567 33.44 
Luapula 0.7007 17.41 
Lusaka 0.0405 0.72 
Northern 0.2437 1.48 
North-Western 0.6560 4.87 
Southern 0.7447 25.88 
Western 0.1047 1.36 
Poverty 
Central 
Copperbelt 
Eastern 
Luapula 
Lusaka 
Northern 
North-Western 
Southern 
Western 
3.6885 
1.7526 
3.8632 
2.4632 
0.5694 
1.3707 
2.9200 
2.9531 
0.9697 
16.95 
7.12 
22.06 
15.23 
2.52 
2.07 
5.39 
25.53 
3.14 
Average Per Adult 
Expenditure by Poor 
(Kwacha) 
3601.72 
3864.66 
2944.75 
3299.32 
3905.69 
3684.66 
3406.53 
3418.52 
3243 .68 
5188.89 
5497.82 
4292.74 
4901.14 
5834.67 
5892.09 
4912.46 
4822.70 
5743.95 
Poor in 
Each Group 
(percent ) 
20.10 
10.51 
38.43 
24 . 41 
3.30 
12 . 50 
22.35 
22.20 
9 . 38 
53 . 30 
36.51 
68 . 77 
58 . 37 
19 . 49 
52.48 
58 . 89 
51.13 
45 . 07 
Households in the Central, Eastern, Luapula, and Southern 
provinces contribute the most to the number of households 
nationally that fall below the poverty datum line. Eastern, 
Luapula, North- Western and Southern provinces all have 
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disproportionately large percentages of poor households. The 
depth of poverty is greatest in the households of the Central, 
Eastern, North- Western and Southern provinces for those 
households falling below the poverty datum line . 
Size Distribution of Households 
The impact of household size and composition on food 
poverty has been referred to previously in this report . A 
closer look at the distribution of household size across food 
expenditu re deciles and the relation of household size to food 
poverty is presented here. 
Table 20 shows t hat the average household size of rural 
households decreases at higher per adult deciles. Urban 
household sizes tend to increase up to the fourth decile and 
then begin to decrease . These trends are still evident after 
household size has been expressed in adult equivalents. 
Nationally there is a clear trend for household size, both 
actual and expressed in adult equivalents , to decrease with 
higher deciles . Rural households are slightly smaller than 
urban households with 5 . 37 and 5.69 average number of members, 
respectively. Households of four or fewer members have the 
greatest percentage of female heads of households and larger 
households had lesser percentages of female heads (Stampley, 
Jensen and Johnson, 1992). 
Larger households, those with six or more members, 
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Table 20 Distribution of household 
Per 
Adult 
Decile 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Mean Household Size 
Rural Urban All Zambia 
6.43 6 . 82 6.44 
6 . 22 6 . 95 6.32 
6.15 7.32 6 . 35 
5.72 7.68 6.13 
5.17 7.36 5.65 
5.12 7.14 5.77 
5.00 6.07 5.29 
4.37 5.65 4.92 
4.66 4.63 4.65 
2 . 74 3 .3 9 3 . 13 
s ize by deciles 
Mean Household Size 
in Eguivalent Adults 
Rural Urban All Zambia 
4.95 5.43 4 . 97 
4.79 5.45 4.88 
4.69 5.61 4 . 85 
4 . 42 6.09 4 . 77 
3.95 5.85 4 . 37 
3.96 5.64 4.50 
3.83 4.8 0 4 . 09 
3.39 4.47 3.85 
3.55 3 . 79 3 . 66 
2.06 2.81 2 . 51 
contribute the most to the extreme poverty group (Table 21 ) . 
Households with more than five members contribute the most to 
the poverty group. Both the extreme poverty and poverty 
groups show i ncreasing percentages of households falling below 
the PDL in each household size group as the size of the 
Table 21 Levels of poverty by household size 
Level of 
Household S i z e Poverty 
Extreme Poverty 
1 0.0009 
2 0.0240 
3 0.0728 
4 0.2664 
5 0 . 3545 
6 0.5259 
7 0.9725 
8 1.0635 
9 1.1575 
10 or more 2.4248 
Poverty 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 or more 
0.0078 
0.1200 
0.3587 
0.8808 
1.4309 
2.2781 
3 .5438 
4.2741 
4.9808 
10.0077 
Contribu tion 
to Total Povert y 
(percent) 
0.01 
0.33 
1 . 47 
5.65 
7.74 
10.50 
17.53 
17.08 
7.62 
32.07 
0.02 
0.41 
l. 80 
4.65 
7.77 
11.31 
15.89 
17.08 
8.15 
32.93 
Average Per Adult 
Expenditure by Poor 
(Kwacha) 
3766 . 67 
3267.05 
3484.57 
3185.89 
3349 . 05 
3389 .82 
3302.74 
3317.27 
3375.51 
3194.78 
5936.20 
5450.58 
5373.39 
5021.30 
5087.81 
4854. 71 
4698.12 
4786.24 
4956.75 
4910 .2 4 
Poor in 
Each Group 
(percent) 
1 . 84 
6.73 
12 . 61 
19.16 
21.68 
25.17 
28 . 12 
28.18 
27 .28 
25.52 
8.25 
28.65 
38.99 
48.95 
56.32 
59 . 32 
61.39 
58.95 
62.64 
67.08 
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household increases . 
A misclassification analysis on h ousehold size concl uded 
that the best cutoff points for household size is f i ve members 
for both the extreme pov erty and poverty groups. Target i ng 
extremely poor househo lds by household size greater than o r 
equal to five is fairly sensitive (sensitivity= . 76 ) with a 
relatively low error of exclusion (error o f exclusion=.24 ). 
The high error of inclusion for targeting extremely poor 
households by size greater than or equal to five woul d resul t 
in many not extremely poor households being incl uded in the 
target group (error of inclusion= . 55 ) . Therefore, some 
additional set of indicators or means testing would be 
necess ary to weed out ineligible households . 
Targeting poor households by hou sehold size greater than or 
equal to five is also fairly sensitive (sensitivity= . 71 ) with 
a fairly high error of exclusion (error of exclusion=.29 ) . 
The error of inclusion for targeting poor hous eholds by size 
greater than or equal to five is also fairly high and would 
result in many not poor households being included i n the 
target group (error of inclusion= .47 ) . 
Gender of the Househol d Head 
Female headship is a more complicated issue than it may at 
first appear. Table 22 shows that the incidence o f poverty 
and extreme poverty are not very different for female headed 
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households than for male headed households. What makes the 
issue of female headship complicated is that female headed 
households have higher average food shares at almost every 
decile than male headed households (table 23). This result is 
consistent with the findings of Kumar (1979) that the 
propensity to consume food is higher for women's incomes than 
men's incomes. 
If female headed households spend a greater share of their 
income on food than do male headed households then a 
definition of poverty based on food expenditure will 
Table 22 Poverty levels by gender of household head 
Level of 
Gender Poverty 
Extreme Poverty 
Male 0.6311 
Female 0.5696 
Poverty 
Male 
Female 
2.6042 
2 . 0319 
Contribution 
to Total Poverty 
(percent) 
81.09 
18.91 
83.22 
16.78 
Average Per Adult 
Expenditure by Poor 
(Kwacha) 
3332.58 
3273.10 
5038.93 
4760 .2 0 
Poor in 
Each Group 
(percent) 
19 . 49 
21.73 
50. 72 
47 .00 
Table 23 Food shares of all households and 
households by deciles 
female headed 
Per Adult Male Headed Households 
Decile Mean Food Share 
1 (lowest ) .8052 
2 .8060 
3 .7830 
4 .7911 
5 .7873 
6 .7703 
7 . 7643 
8 . 7487 
9 .7285 
10 (highest) .7216 
Female Headed 
Mean Food 
.8391 
.8399 
. 8431 
.8281 
.8657 
.7946 
.8461 
.7396 
.7668 
.7504 
Households 
Shares 
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discriminate against female headed households. This is 
because they may be spending more on food but have lower 
actual incomes. Further, a higher propensity to consume food 
by female headed households makes food subsidies more 
effective in meeting the nutritional needs of the recipients . 
Age Distribution of Households 
Table 24 shows a tendency for the dependency ratio (number 
of chi ldren/number of adults) to decrease at higher deciles . 
This trend holds for the rural and urban areas as well as all 
of Zambia . 
Table 24 Mean dependency ratios by deciles 
Per Adult Mean Dependency Ratio 
Decile Rural Urban All Zambia 
1 1.63 1.11 1.61 
2 1.49 1 . 42 1 . 48 
3 1 .53 1.85 1.58 
4 1.52 1 .50 1.52 
5 1 . 41 1.39 1 . 40 
6 1.30 1.38 1.32 
7 1.24 1.28 1 . 25 
8 1 . 01 1.36 1.16 
9 1.08 0.98 1.03 
10 0 . 52 0.67 0 . 60 
Table 25 shows that the percentage of preschoolers in a 
household does not show much of a trend , except at the highest 
deciles where it begins to fall . 
Although households headed by older persons (56+ years ) 
have a higher incidence of poverty than households headed by 
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Table 25 Percent of household members less than 
(preschoolers) by per adult deciles 
six years old 
Per Adult 
Decile 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Rural 
15.40 
17.34 
15 . 81 
14 . 22 
15 . 46 
14.29 
13 . 06 
12 . 55 
11. 66 
9 . 85 
Percent of Household 
Members Less Than 6 
Urban All Zambia 
13.69 15.34 
12.54 16.70 
14.82 15.64 
10.63 13.45 
18.21 16.07 
15.31 14 . 62 
16.59 14.01 
14 . 61 13.43 
11.18 11 . 45 
10.41 10.18 
younger persons (18 - 55 years), the vast majority of the poor 
are in hous eholds headed by younger persons. For the national 
population, the differences in percent of poor in each group 
for both poverty lines are not especially dramatic (Table 26 ) . 
This indicates that targeting households with older heads at 
the national level would be ineffective because it would 
exclude most poor households while not reaching a particularly 
poverty-prone group. 
For urban households only, households headed by older 
persons are much more likely to be in poverty (Table 27 ) . 
Table 26 Level of poverty by age class of househol d head-All 
Zambia 
Level of Contribution Average Per Adult Poor in 
Age Class Poverty to Total Poverty E~enditure by Poor Each Grou12 
Extreme Poverty (percent) (Kwacha) (percent ) 
18-55 0.6400 88.95 3319 . 57 20.13 
56+ 0.4869 11. 05 3317 . 37 18.88 
Poverty 
18-55 2 . 5360 87 . 67 4964.59 49 . 70 
56+ 2.1847 12.33 5106 . 15 51.49 
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Table 27 Level of poverty by age class of household head-Urban 
Level of Contribution Average Per Adult Poor in 
Poverty to Total Poverty Expenditure by Poor Each Group 
Extreme Poverty (percent) (Kwacha) (percent ) 
18-55 0.0914 94.18 3817.07 5.53 
56+ 0.1034 5.82 3891.85 16.09 
Poverty 
18-55 
56+ 
0.9645 
1.9880 
89 . 89 
10.11 
5697.05 
5545.90 
25.94 
57 . 96 
While it is still the case that the majority of urban poor 
households are headed by a younger person, the large 
proportion of urban households that are headed by an older 
person that are in poverty, suggests that age of the household 
head is a useful indicator for urban poverty. 
Educational Level of the Household Head 
Table 28 shows that the greatest incidence of extreme 
poverty is among the no education group while the primary only 
group contributes the most to total extreme poverty. The same 
is true for the poverty group. 
Misclassification analysis showed that the most effective 
targeting indicator by educational level is for the combined 
groups, no education and primary schooling only. For rural 
areas and all of Zambia the sensitivity of this indicator was 
high while the error of exclusion was low (Table 29) . This 
held for both the extreme poverty and poverty groups. This 
indicator was much less effective for urban areas though, with 
fairly low sensitivity and fairly high errors of exclusion, 
regardless of which poverty line was used. 
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Table 28 Level of poverty by educational status of head of 
household 
Level of Contribution 
Education Poverty to Total Poverty 
Average Per Adult 
Expenditure by Poor 
Poor in 
Each Group 
Rural 
Extreme Poverty 
No Education 0.9541 
Primary Only 0.8950 
Seconda ry Only 0.5740 
Higher Ed 0.0016 
Not Applicable 0.1127 
Poverty 
No Education 
Primary Only 
Secondary Only 
Higher Ed 
Not Applicable 
Urban 
Extreme Poverty 
3.4207 
3.3096 
2.1976 
0.5019 
1.3044 
No Education 0.1489 
Primary Onl y 0.1481 
Secondary Only 0.0451 
Higher Ed 0.0695 
Not Applicable 0.0000 
Poverty 
No Education 
Primary Only 
Secondary Only 
Higher Ed 
Not Applicable 
1 .9169 
1. 3264 
0.7791 
0.5516 
1 . 2222 
(percent) 
28.48 
61.44 
9.91 
0.01 
0.17 
27.52 
61. 23 
10.22 
0.49 
0.54 
9.90 
58.39 
21.05 
10.66 
0.00 
11.52 
47.30 
32.88 
7.65 
0.65 
(Kwacha) 
3234 .41 
3257.17 
3415.55 
3859 .74 
3798.35 
4753.91 
4796 .40 
5125.81 
6426.64 
5014.46 
3954.45 
3728.50 
3925.05 
3680.93 
0.00 
4753.91 
4796.40 
5125.81 
6426.64 
5014.46 
Table 29 Misclassification measures for targeting 
households headed by a person with no or 
schooling only. By rural. urban and all 
Poverty Group Measure Rural Urban 
Extreme Poverty 
Poverty 
sensitivity 
specificity 
error of exclusion 
error of inclusion 
sensitivity 
specificity 
error of exclusion 
error of inclusion 
. 8961 
.2134 
.1039 
.7866 
. 8622 
. 2537 
.1378 
.7463 
.6570 
.5911 
.3430 
.4089 
.5734 
.6330 
.4266 
.3670 
(percent) 
30.69 
26.82 
16.51 
0.84 
20.50 
63. 72 
61.59 
43.89 
39.98 
50.74 
19 .95 
7.65 
4.05 
2.46 
0.00 
63.72 
61.59 
43.89 
39.98 
50.74 
to 
primary 
Zambia 
All Zambia 
.8755 
.339 1 
.1245 
.6609 
.8170 
.4095 
.1830 
. 5905 
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Marital Status of Household Head 
Households in which the hous ehold head has never been 
married tend to fall into the upper deciles. This reflects 
the same finding that households in which only one person 
r esides tend to fall into the higher deciles. 
Hous e holds with married, widowed and divorced heads show no 
particular trend across deciles (Table 30) . Households with a 
married head contribute the most to total poverty and extreme 
poverty (Tab le 31 ) . None of the marital s tatus groups show an 
exceptionally disproportionate number of poor households. 
Table 30 Percent distribution 
heads b y deciles 
Per Adult 
Decile 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Single 
4 . 55 
4.04 
4.00 
6.57 
2.35 
3 . 51 
7 . 24 
8.92 
13.32 
24 . 18 
Married 
80 . 24 
80.76 
81.29 
75. 4 8 
80.00 
81. 92 
76.60 
77.26 
66 . 79 
59 . 31 
of marital statu s of hous ehold 
Widowed 
7 . 37 
8.17 
8.45 
4.84 
7.66 
6 . 03 
6 . 42 
7.16 
9.12 
6 . 01 
Divorced 
7 . 84 
7 . 03 
6 . 27 
13.11 
9 . 99 
8 . 54 
9.74 
6.66 
10.76 
10 . 49 
Table 31 Levels of poverty by marital status of household head 
Marital Level of Contribution Ave r age Per Adult Poor in 
Status Poverty to Total Poverty Expenditure by Poor Each Group 
Extreme Poverty (percent) (Kwacha) (percent) 
Single 0.3267 4.16 3013.41 10.89 
Married 0.6831 83.89 3322.19 21.14 
Widowed 0.6085 7.01 3313.52 21.77 
Divorced 0.3379 4.94 3470.44 16.41 
Poverty 
Single 1.1677 3.70 4815.50 27.29 
Marri ed 2.7535 84.11 4972.13 52.31 
Widowed 2.0685 5.92 4909. 71 51.23 
Divorced 1.7238 6.27 5245.84 48.92 
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Employment and Sources of Income 
Rural households show a pattern of increased wage 
employment by the household head as deciles increase, but no 
particular trend for any other employment status (Table 32) . 
Table 32 Percent of deciles by employment status of 
household head - all of Zambia 
Per Adult Self- Wage 
Decile Employed Employee 
1 79.75 12.43 
2 76.91 17.95 
3 75.00 19.86 
4 75.08 19.94 
5 64.91 28.26 
6 60.82 33.32 
7 62.90 31 . 56 
8 58 . 31 36.61 
9 48.44 47.85 
10 44.39 50.72 
Unemployed 
2 . 92 
3 .47 
4 . 09 
3.16 
5 . 41 
4.23 
3 . 22 
3 .06 
2.88 
3 . 31 
Not 
Applicable 
4. 90 
1. 66 
1.06 
1. 81 
1. 41 
1. 64 
2.23 
2.03 
0.84 
1.16 
Self-employed household heads are more common in rural areas 
than in urban areas. Urban household heads are more likely to 
be wage and salaried workers than are rural households . 
Households with self - employed heads contribu te the most to 
total poverty and total extreme poverty (Table 33 ) . 
Households headed by wage earners show a lower incidence of 
poverty and extreme poverty than other employment groups. 
Table 34 shows the average number of different income 
sources for h ouseholds by decile. Sources of income are by 
sector , e.g . wages and salaries, informal sector earnings , 
agriculture, etc . This variable is important in examining the 
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Table 33 Levels of poverty by employment status of household 
head 
Employment Level of Contribution Average Per Adult Poor in 
Status Poverty to Total Poverty E~enditure by Poor Each GrouQ 
Extreme Poverty (percent) (Kwacha) (percent ) 
Self-Employed 0.7547 78.88 3286.31 24.lB 
Employee 0.3124 lS.OB 3514.60 10. 1 5 
Unemployed 0.4057 2.33 3532.36 17.91 
Not Applicable 1.1806 3. 71 2994 . 83 33.70 
Poverty 
Self-Employed 2.9480 76 . 63 4876.06 57.42 
Employee 1 . 4540 17.46 5414 . 14 32.99 
Unemployed 2.3432 3.35 S303.S2 S3 . 59 
Not AQQlicable 3.277S 2 . S6 4261.S2 SS.Bl 
Table 34 Average number of different income sources 
Per Adult 
Decile All Zambia Rural Urban 
1 0.8862 0.8709 1.2637 
2 1.0798 0.9750 1.7559 
3 1.1674 1 . 0868 1. 5481 
4 1. 3198 1. 2161 1. 7039 
5 1.2093 1. 0725 1.6881 
6 1.3103 1.1293 1. 6905 
7 1.4014 1.3086 1.6558 
8 1. 4280 1.2964 1. 6054 
9 1.4200 1. 3493 1. 5102 
10 1.3130 1.1527 1. 4213 
role of diversity in the economic base of a household and its 
welfare. The number of different sources of income increases 
as deciles increase up to about the eighth decile and then 
begin to fall. Urban households show more different sources 
of income than do rural households at all deciles. 
Conclusi ons 
The preceding analysis identified a number of demographic, 
geographic and income source variables that would be useful as 
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targeting indicators. There are differences in per adult 
equivalent food expenditures among provinces, and within 
provinces there are much lower per adult equivalent food 
expenditures in rural areas than in urban areas. Households 
with more members tend to have lower per adult equivalent food 
expenditures than households with fewer members, especially 
those households with larger numbers of children. Urban 
households with an older head (56+ years) are more likely to 
be food-poor than are households with younger heads (18-55 
years). Households that are headed by a person with little or 
no education are much more likely to be food-poor than 
households headed by a person with some secondary or higher 
eduction. Among rural households, a variety of income sources 
is associated with an improvement in per adult equivalent food 
expenditures. 
The preceding analysis presented some results on the 
inclusivity and exclusivity of households in the truly extreme 
poverty and truly poverty groups when defined by alternative 
targeting indicators. These are important results because 
they suggest the cost effectiveness and targeting 
effectiveness of various targeting indicators. 
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CHAPTER 8. 
FOOD CONSUMPTION WELFARE 
The objective of this chapter is to identify which 
potential targeting indicators are statistically significant 
in predicting per adult equivalent food expenditure and in 
predicting which households fall into the extreme poverty 
group and the poverty group . Two regression techniques were 
employed in this analysis . Ordinary least squares regress ion 
was used to analyze predictors for per adult equivalent food 
expenditure . Probit analysis was used to analyze which 
variables were significant predictors for the inclusion of 
households in the extreme poverty and poverty groups. A 
discussion of those predictors found to be statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level follows a description 
of the variables and regression techniques. Tables of the 
regression results are found at the end of the chapter. 
I ndependent Variabl es 
The set of independent variables for the welfare regression 
and each of the probit regressions are the same. These 
variables reflect many of the potential targeting indicators 
that were revealed in the previous chapter. Definitions for 
each of the independent variables included in the regressions 
are presented below. 
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Intercept : is the constant term. 
Household Size : is the number of members of the 
household. 
Percent Preschool ers is as defined in the previous 
chapter. 
Dependency Rat i o: is as defined in the previous chapter. 
Female Headship : is a dummy variable that =1 if the 
household head is a woman, and =0 if the household head 
is a man . 
Single Head: is a dummy variable that =1 if the household 
head has never been married, and =0 otherwise. 
Widowed/Divor ced: is a dummy variable that =l if the 
household head is either widowed or divorced, and =0 
otherwise. 
Older Head: is a dummy variable that =1 if the household 
head is 56 years of age or older, and =0 otherwise. 
No Education : is a dummy variable that =l if the 
household head has no formal schooling, and =0 otherwise . 
Primary Educati on On l y: is a dummy variable that =l if 
the household head has at least some primary education 
but no education at any higher level, and =0 otherwise. 
Higher Educati on: is a dummy variable that =l if the 
household head has some higher education, and =0 
otherwise . 
Self - Employed : is a dummy variable that =l if the 
household head is self-employed, and =0 otherwise. 
Unemployed : is a dummy variable that =l if the household 
head is unemployed, and =0 otherwise. 
Sources o f Income: is as defined in the previous chapter. 
Rural Location : is a dummy variable that =l if the 
household is located in a rural area, and =0 if it is 
located in an urban area. 
% Food Purchased : is the ratio of the household's 
expenditure on purchased foods to the household ' s total 
food expenditure (purchased and home produced f oods ) . 
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Welfare Analysis 
The measure of welfare used here is the natural log of per 
adult equivalent food expenditure. Due to some fundamental 
differences between rural and urban Zambia in terms of access 
to food, education and employment, separate analyses were 
conducted for rural and urban households in addition to a 
combined data set. The results of the three regress ion runs 
are presented in Table 35. 
An ordinary least squares regression was performed on the 
set of demographic, geographic and food consumption variables 
listed above in order to identify which variables were 
significant in estimating the level of a household's food 
expenditure . Variables to be included on the right hand side 
of the equation were chosen because of their relevance to 
identifying potential targeting indicators . 
Probit Analyses 
Probit analyses were conducted to identify significant 
predictors for inclusion of households into each of the 
poverty groups. The probit regressions were conducted using 
the statistical software package SHAZAM. Again, separate 
analyses were conducted for rural and urban areas, and al l of 
Zambia. Table 36 presents the results of the probit 
regression for the "extreme poverty group" . Table 37 presents 
the results of the probit regression for the "poverty group". 
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Results 
Household size was found to be a statistically significant 
predictor for food expenditure in the welfare regression. The 
coefficient has a negative sign reflecting the finding that 
larger households tend to have lower per adult equivalent food 
expenditures. Household size was also significant in 
predicting extreme poverty and poverty in the probit 
regressions. 
For rural areas and all of Zambia the percentage of 
preschoolers in a household decreases at higher deciles (Table 
25 ) . This is borne out by the welfare regression and the 
probit regressions as well . Percent of preschoolers is 
negatively associated with per adult equivalent food 
expenditure, although not significantly . The probit analysis 
revealed that percent of preschoolers is positively associated 
with both the extreme poverty and poverty groups, but aga in, 
not significantly so. 
The dependency ratio variable was found to be a 
statistically significant predictor for per adult equivalent 
food expenditure in the welfare regression for rural and all 
Zambia with a negative coefficient . The dependency ratio was 
significant in predicting poverty for the rural areas and all 
of Zambia but not for urban areas. It was not a significant 
predictor of extreme poverty. 
Female headship was not an important predictor for per 
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adult equivalent food expenditure, nor was it important in 
predicting inclusion in the extreme poverty group. Female 
headship was important in predicting inclusion in the poverty 
group for rural households . 
Urban households headed by a person that has never been 
married are associated with higher per adult equivalent food 
expenditure while this factor has no effect in rural areas. 
Urban households headed by a person who is either widowed 
or divorced tend to have higher per adult equivalent food 
expenditures although this appears to have no impact on 
inclusion in the poverty groups . 
Rural households headed by an older person (56+ years o f 
age) are associated with higher per adult equivalent food 
expenditures and are less likely to be included in the extreme 
poverty and poverty groups. This is not true, however, for 
urban areas where older headed households are more likely to 
be included in the poverty group. 
The various educational levels of the household head had 
significant coefficients in the welfare analysis and the 
probit analyses . No education and primary eduction only were 
associated with lower per adult equivalent food expenditure as 
well as inclusion in the extreme poverty and poverty groups. 
Higher education was associated with higher per adult 
equivalent food expenditures and not being included in the 
extreme poverty and poverty groups. Primary only and higher 
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education were not significant predictors for inclusion in the 
extreme poverty group for urban areas, although no education 
was significant and had a large coefficient. Rural household 
heads tend to have lower levels of education than do urban 
household heads. However, it may be seen from the separate 
urban and rural analyses that educational level remains 
significant in predicting per adult equivalent food 
expenditure, and therefore, is not simply a confounder of the 
rural/urban dichotomy. The difference in levels of 
educational attainment may be a factor in the rural/urban 
split in welfare. 
Being self-employed is positively associated with per adult 
equivalent food expenditures in rural areas only. Be ing an 
employee is not significantly associated with inclusion in the 
extreme poverty or poverty group, nor with per adult 
equivalent food expenditures. 
The welfare and probit analyses show that the number of 
different sources of income is positively associated with per 
adult equivalent food expenditure and exclusion from the 
extreme poverty and poverty groups for all of Zambia and, 
especially, rural areas . This points out that off-farm income 
is an important factor in alleviating rural poverty . 
Rural location is a significant, and negative , predictor of 
per adult food expenditure. Rural location is also a 
significant predictor of inclusion in the poverty group and, 
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especially, the extreme poverty group . This again confirms 
that Zambia's food deficit problem is overwhelmingly a rural 
phenomenon. 
The welfare analysis shows that as the percentage of the 
total food budget made up by purchased foods increases, per 
adult food expenditure increases. This may, in part, reflect 
the under-valuation of home produced foods as discussed in 
chapter 4, but it, most likely, reflects a greater dependence 
on home produced foods among poorer households. The probit 
analyses bear this out. Percent of food purchased is 
significantly associated with exclusion from the extreme 
poverty and poverty groups. The coefficients are largest for 
the urban only analyses, indicating a greater reliance on the 
commercial food market for wealthier urban households. 
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Table 35 Ordinary least squares food expenditure estimation 
Estimated Coefficient 
Variable All Zambia Rural Urban 
Dependent Variable: 
Natural Log of 
Per Adult Equivalent 
Food Expenditure 
Independent Variables: 
Intercept 
Household Size 
Percent Preschoolers 
Dependency Ratio 
Female Headship 
Single Head 
Widowed/Divorced 
Older Head 
No Education 
Primary Education Only 
Higher Education 
Self-Employed 
Employee 
Sources of Income 
Rural Location 
% Food Purchased 
F value 
R squared 
Adjusted R squared 
Observations 
9.2050 
(119 .49 ) 
-0 . 0633 
(-14.04) 
-0.0447 
(-0 .56 ) 
- 0.0524 
(-4.33) 
0.0061 
(0.15) 
0.1808 
(3.75) 
0.0902 
(2. 01) 
0 . 2423 
(6.68) 
-0.2953 
( - 7.05) 
- 0.2188 
(-6.95) 
0.3300 
(6.17) 
0.1005 
(1.92) 
- 0.0420 
(-0.73) 
0.0789 
(5.14) 
-0 . 1482 
( - 3.82) 
0.5150 
(9.94) 
81. 948 
0.3366 
0.3325 
2439 
8.9213 
(109.32) 
-0 .0536 
( - 10.10) 
-0.0620 
(-0.66) 
-0 . 0583 
(-4.09) 
0 . 0405 
(0 .79 ) 
0.0122 
(0 .19 ) 
0.0707 
( 1. 32) 
0.2754 
(6.85) 
-0.2708 
(-5 . 30) 
-0.2005 
(-4.73) 
0.2185 
(2.38) 
0.1378 
(2 . 16) 
0.0065 
(0 . 08) 
0.1255 
(6 .29 ) 
0 . 4891 
(8.08) 
34.55 
0.2249 
0 . 2184 
1682 
note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
9.2395 
(48.10) 
-0.0962 
( - 11.42) 
-0 . 0048 
( - 0 . 04) 
-0.0237 
( -1. 04) 
-0.0956 
(-1.40) 
0.3066 
(4.39) 
0.1572 
(1.99) 
- 0.0604 
( - 0 . 66) 
-0.3353 
(-3.79) 
-0.2056 
( - 4.65) 
0.3828 
( 6. 50) 
0.0244 
( 0. 27) 
-0.1177 
( - 1.42) 
0.0131 
(0.57) 
0 . 8192 
(4.92) 
35.44 
0.4007 
0.3894 
757 
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Table 36 Probit estimation for the extreme poverty measure 
Estimated Coefficient 
Variable All Zambia Rural 
Dependent Variable: 
Dummy Variable: 
=l if below extreme poverty line 
=0 if not below extreme poverty line 
Independent Variables: 
Intercept 
Household Size 
Percent Preschoolers 
Dependency Ratio 
Female Headship 
Single Head 
Widowed/Divorced 
Older Head 
No Education 
Primary Only 
Higher Education 
Self - Employed 
Employee 
Sources of Income 
Rural Location 
% Food Purchased 
- 1. 3092 
( - 6 . 12) 
0 . 0843 
(7.84) 
0.2315 
( 1. 11) 
0.0242 
(0 .78 ) 
0.1913 
(1.63) 
- 0.1590 
(-1.06) 
-0.2938 
(-2.33) 
-0 .3299 
( - 3.43) 
0.5721 
(5.07) 
0.3395 
(3.70) 
- 0.7303 
(- 2.78) 
-0.1486 
( - 1.06) 
0.2472 
(1.48) 
- 0 . 2486 
(-5 .52 ) 
0 .4160 
(3 .46) 
- 0.7575 
( - 5.39) 
-0.8080 
( - 4.04) 
0.0874 
(7.52) 
0.3005 
( 1. 32) 
0.0275 
(0 .82 ) 
0.1877 
(1.47) 
-0.0224 
(-0.13) 
- 0.2573 
(-1.89) 
- 0 .3834 
( -3. 73) 
0.4771 
(3.74) 
0.2756 
(2.54) 
- 1.4621 
(-2.51) 
-0.1645 
( - 1.07) 
0.1243 
(0.62) 
-0.3183 
( - 6 . 08) 
-0.5907 
( - 3.82) 
Log Likelihood -1218.90 -953.99 
Observations 2439 1682 
note: t - statistics are given in parentheses 
Urban 
-0.6838 
(-1.03) 
0.0656 
(1. 95) 
-0.2389 
(-0.39 ) 
0.0357 
(0 . 39) 
0.3846 
(1.00) 
-1. 3085 
( - 1.72) 
-0.7315 
(-1.69) 
0.2137 
(0 . 68) 
0.9464 
( 3. 09) 
0.3595 
(1.92) 
- 0.2279 
(-0.74) 
- 0 . 2459 
( - 0.58) 
0.4237 
(1. 08 ) 
- 0.0467 
(-0.48) 
- 1.7985 
( - 3.49) 
-173.47 
757 
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Table 37 Probit estimation for the poverty measure 
Estimated Coefficient 
Variable All Zambia Rural Urban 
Dependent Variable: 
Dummy Variable: 
=1 if below poverty line 
=0 if not below poverty line 
Independent Variables: 
Intercept 
Household Size 
Percent Preschoolers 
Dependency Ratio 
Female Headship 
Single Head 
Widowed/Divorced 
Older Head 
No Education 
Primary Only 
Higher Education 
Self-Employed 
Employee 
Sources of Income 
Rural Location 
% Food Purchased 
-0.3687 
(-2.03) 
0 . 0981 
(9 .49) 
0.0798 
(0.43 ) 
0.1230 
(4.27 ) 
-0.3233 
( -3.23 ) 
-0.1200 
(-0 .98 ) 
0.1107 
(1. 05) 
-0.3078 
(-3.68) 
0.5937 
(6 . 06) 
0.3740 
(5.09) 
- 0 . 3916 
( -2.78) 
- 0.1865 
( -1.48 ) 
-0.0153 
(-0.11 ) 
-0.1606 
( - 4 . 35) 
0.2616 
(2. 85) 
-0.8090 
(-6 . 72) 
0.0749 
( 0. 40 ) 
0 .0837 
( 7 . 11 ) 
0.1690 
( 0. 79 ) 
0.1353 
(4.03 ) 
-0.3362 
(- 2.92 ) 
0.0475 
(0.32 ) 
0.0997 
( 0 . 83 ) 
-0.3947 
(-4.34) 
0.5685 
(4.90) 
0 .3 676 
(3.86 ) 
-0 . 0300 
( -0.14 ) 
- 0.2469 
( -1.63 ) 
-0.1645 
( -0.88 ) 
- 0.2386 
( -5.16 ) 
-0 . 7025 
(-5.16 ) 
Log Likelihood -1690.60 - 1139.30 
Observations 2439 1682 
note: t-statistics are given in parentheses 
-0.3184 
( -0.60 ) 
0.1678 
( 7. 15 ) 
-0.0603 
(- 0.15 ) 
0.0572 
(0.95 ) 
-0.2009 
( -0.90 ) 
-0.3850 
( -1.47 ) 
0.0781 
(0 . 33 ) 
0 . 5499 
(2 . 29 ) 
0 .7120 
(3. 03 ) 
0.2946 
(2. 43 ) 
-0 . 7681 
( -3.70 ) 
- 0 .0944 
( -0.37 ) 
0.1827 
(0.76 ) 
- 0 . 0356 
( -0.54) 
-1. 5902 
( - 3 . 52) 
-445.98 
757 
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CHAPTER 9 . 
FOOD CONSUMPTION PATTERNS 
An understanding of the diets of target households is 
essential for creating effective food policy. Targeted food 
subsidies should be on those foods that the target population 
consumes most of ten or on foods that fill a nutritional 
deficiency in their diets. 
This chapter seeks to identify trends in the comp osition of 
the diets of households by level of per adult equivalent food 
expenditure. A decile analysis is presented using the deciles 
as created in chapter 7 (whereby households have been ranked 
on per adult equivalent food expenditure) . The reader should 
bear in mind that the extreme poverty group consists of the 
first and second deciles and that the poverty group consists 
of the first through fifth deciles. 
Food Shares and Food Expendi tur es 
Mean food budget shares were computed as the mean of the 
ratio of food expenditure to total expenditure (food and 
nonfood) for each household within a decile. As Table 38 
shows, mean food budget shares fall with higher deciles , but 
even the highest deciles have large food shares. But, the 
share of total, national expenditure on food for each decile 
is highly skewed to the upper deciles (Table 39) . 
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Table 38 Mean food budget shares by decile 
Per Adult 
Decile Share 
1 . 8130 
2 .8133 
3 .7925 
4 .7990 
5 .7988 
6 . 7746 
7 .7811 
8 . 7466 
9 . 7386 
10 .7277 
Table 39 Share of total , national food expenditure by deciles 
Per Adu l t 
Decile Share of Food Expenditure 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
0.0337 
0.0505 
0.0637 
0.0745 
0.0813 
0.0987 
0.1065 
0.1244 
0 . 1556 
0.2111 
Diet Compositi on 
Shares of food budget for various foods were computed as 
the ratio of the expenditure for the particular food to the 
total food expenditure of the household . This measure is 
useful in examining the importance of particular food items in 
the diets of households and how the diets of households change 
by level of per adult equivalent food expenditure . 
The composition of the food basket changes by decile, as 
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the higher deciles purchase relatively more meat and less 
tubers and cereals than do the lower deciles (Table 4 0) . 
Particular foods are more important in the diets of some 
decile classes than others. Bread and rice are more important 
(larger food budget share ) in the diets of the upper deciles 
while maize meal and cassava flour is more important in the 
lower deciles. Other foods more important to the diets of the 
upper deciles are beef, chicken, milk , eggs, cooking oil, 
tomatoes and sugar. Other foods more important in the diets 
of the lower deciles are sweet potatoes, beans, and ground 
nuts. 
Households in the lower deciles have relatively larger food 
budget shares for carbohydrate source foods, while the upper 
deciles have relatively larger food budget shares for protein 
source foods (Table 41) . Primarily carbohydrate source foods 
are defined here as the sum of bread, cassava flour, cassava, 
sweet potatoes, beans , maize products, rice and sugar. 
Primarily protein source foods are defined here as the sum of 
beef , chicken, fresh fish, dried fish, dried kapenta, milk, 
and eggs. Food budget shares for vegetables show a slight 
trend to become more important in the diets of the upper 
deciles. This may be due to under-reported (or undervalued ) 
foods acquired outside of market channels. 
A large proportion of the food budgets of rural households 
is home produced, rather than purchased. Table 42 shows the 
129 
Table 40 Shares of food budget by foods and per adult 
deciles 
P/ A Hammer Maize Breakfast Roller All Maize Cassava 
Decile Bread Rice Meal Grain Meal Meal Products Flour 
1 0.01 0.42 23.93 1. 72 0.67 3.34 29.66 
2 0.24 0.39 16.45 2.29 0.45 2.37 21. 56 
3 0.78 0.74 14.24 2. 15 0.87 2.60 19.87 
4 0.57 1. 33 12.06 2. 13 1.18 2.74 18.10 
5 0.56 1.57 11 .09 1. 54 1.97 3.66 18.25 
6 1.51 1. 21 8.48 1.19 1.53 3.07 14.28 
7 1.43 1.42 8.31 1. 86 1. 64 2.02 13.83 
8 2.52 2.47 6.44 1.18 2.98 2.44 13.04 
9 3.25 1. 54 6.40 1. 05 2.84 2.19 12.48 
10 4.62 1. 67 3.61 0.96 3.16 1. 92 9.64 
P/ A Sweet Dried Fresh Dried 
Decile Potatoes Beans Beef Chicken Ka12enta Fish Fish Milk Eggs 
1 5.39 3 .16 2.45 2.01 2.36 1.67 3.14 0. 13 0.08 
2 6.03 3.17 3.16 2.86 2 . 31 1. 80 4 . 73 0 .11 0.24 
3 6.09 2.64 3.82 2.88 2.22 3.00 4.70 0.45 0.23 
4 5.44 3 . 46 5.08 2.77 2.29 2.49 5.74 0.58 0.12 
5 6.49 4.07 4.18 2.63 2.13 3.43 4 .26 0.20 0.31 
6 5.84 3.55 5.17 3.94 3.73 3.39 4.68 0.58 0. 45 
7 5.43 2.98 5.60 4 . 12 2.99 3.28 4.14 0.93 0. 42 
8 4.60 2.79 7.04 4.00 3.25 4.19 4.38 0.96 0.68 
9 3.82 2.50 7 . 44 5.36 2.91 4 .55 5.32 1.43 0.79 
10 2.70 2.31 10.96 5.73 3.31 3.56 3.02 2.27 1.25 
P/A Ground Rape 
Decile Cabbage Onions Tomatoes PumQkin Okra Nuts Seed Sugar 
1 0.68 0.04 0.77 1.45 1.23 8 . 81 3 . 24 1. 73 
2 1. 03 0.13 1.23 1.21 1 . 07 10.57 3.69 1.31 
3 1.25 0.19 1.45 1.47 1.04 8.33 3.85 2.09 
4 1.23 0 . 42 1. 62 2.55 1. 01 5.80 3.43 2.02 
5 0.78 0 .42 1.69 1.88 0.59 7.15 3.07 2 .68 
6 1. 05 0.51 2.15 1.55 0.66 6.96 4 .12 3.17 
7 1. 08 0.54 1. 89 1.78 0.53 6.40 3.04 3 . 41 
8 1.14 1. 00 2.50 1.40 1.00 5.56 2.97 3.95 
9 0.98 0.73 2.85 1.10 0.50 3.92 3.51 4.58 
10 1.47 1.15 3.03 0.72 0.59 2.44 3.52 3.83 
Table 41 Mean share of the food budget by food groups 
Per Adult 
Decile Carbohydrates 
1 0 . 4571 
2 0.4008 
3 0 . 3718 
4 0 . 3859 
5 0.3719 
6 0.3363 
7 0.3486 
8 0 . 2830 
9 0.2816 
10 0.2242 
Protein 
0.1184 
0.1520 
0.1729 
0.1907 
0.1714 
0.2194 
0 . 2148 
0 . 2451 
0.2779 
0 . 3011 
Vegetables 
0 . 0417 
0.0468 
0.0538 
0.0684 
0 .0537 
0 . 0592 
0.0581 
0.0704 
0.0617 
0 . 0695 
8.43 
9.32 
7. 47 
11. 02 
6.87 
6.36 
7.69 
2.55 
4.32 
1.93 
Oil 
0.53 
1. 36 
1.95 
2.47 
2.99 
3.90 
3.67 
4 .7 5 
4.31 
4.52 
Salt 
2.19 
1. 99 
1. 59 
1. 79 
1. 52 
1 . 20 
1.44 
1. 50 
1.14 
1.19 
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Table 42 Proportion of food expenditure that is purchased 
Per Adult 
Decile Rural Urban All Zambia 
1 .2353 .7083 .2571 
2 .2305 .8882 .2746 
3 . 2653 .8994 .4059 
4 . 2824 .9485 .3658 
5 . 3010 . 9143 .4426 
6 . 3024 .9304 . 5049 
7 . 3261 .9564 .5090 
8 .3987 .9549 .6107 
9 .4471 .9715 .7146 
10 .5269 .9728 .8303 
mean share of the food budget that is purchased by deciles . 
Purchased foods become a greater share of the food budget at 
higher deciles. 
Expendi ture Elast ici ties for Foods 
Stampley (1993) estimated expenditure elasticities from the 
1991 HEIS data . Separate analyses were conducted for rural 
and urban areas, and all of Zambia. The elasticities for 
meat, breakfas t meal , bread and rice were found to be higher 
than for the other foods in rural areas . All other foods in 
rural areas were found to be normal goods. In urban areas, 
hammer-milled maize, whole maize grain, and cassava flour were 
found to be inferior goods . 
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CHAPTER 1 0 . 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSI ONS 
This paper has presented an overview of the political 
environment in which food subsidies have come to play an 
important role in the Zambian economy. This environment 
eventually led to a crisis situation in which it was 
recognized that some adjustment in the country's maize subsidy 
policies woul d have to be made . The 1991 HEIS was carried out 
with the aim of supplying information useful in designing a 
new set of food subsidy policies that are sensitive to 
Zambia's, sometimes conflicting, economic and social welfare 
goals. 
The Polic y Env ironment 
The impact that policies to provision the mines with a 
reliable and convenient stapl e have had on the Zambian economy 
has been tremendous . Maize subsidies became entrenched, not 
so much out of a desire to feed the poorest of Zambians , but 
to effect a number of political objectives . The resultant 
political environment trapped the Government in an intractable 
situation. The cost of maize subsidies spiraled out of 
control leading to a crisis situation of excessive budget 
deficits. Facing credit restrictions the Government was 
forced to turn to the IMF who demanded curtailment of the 
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maize subsidy program. Any reduction of maize subsidies 
though, would threaten the political power base of the 
governing party. Thus the administration of President Kaunda 
was forced to choose between bankruptcy and popular rebellion . 
The new administration of President Chiluba has been 
successful in finally shedding the burden of maize subsidies 
from the government budget, but has the drought relief program 
ma intained public expectations of continued access to low cost 
maize meal? 
The failure of these policies is in that they have created 
a dependence on maize as the staple food and altered the 
traditional structure of agricultural production. Dependence 
on maize as the only acceptable staple among urban consumers 
who demand ready access to cheap, regular supplies has pitted 
the interests of the urban sector against those of rural 
producers . 
The Cont ribution o f t he 1991 HEIS 
The 1991 Household Expenditures and Incomes Survey offers 
some insight into the nature of the distribution of food 
expenditures in Zambia . These insights can be put to use in 
meeting the stated objectives of this study, which were : 1) to 
identify food deficit households, 2) to identify common 
characteristics of food deficit households, 3) to examine the 
consumption patterns of food deficit households and, 4 ) to 
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suggest alternative policy recorrunendations. This chapter will 
address the objectives of the study and sununarize the evidence 
from the 1991 HEIS. 
Identifying Food Deficit Househol ds 
An approach for evaluating the food deficit status of 
households has been presented. This approach begins by 
standardizing household food expenditures to be able to make 
direct welfare comparisons between households. The 
standardized measure of household food welfare was expressed 
as the per adult equivalent food expenditure and was used as 
the measure of food consumption welfare rather than some 
measure of income. 
Two relative poverty lines were drawn defining households 
as poor or extremely poor in terms of per adult equivalent 
food expenditure for a classification of "food poverty". 
Poverty defined by alternative measures of welfare was 
compared by using the food poverty groups to determine if 
alternative measures of welfare would fail to identify those 
households that wou ld most benefit from a food subsidy. It 
was found that total household expenditure was a poor measure 
of food poverty while per capita household expenditure was 
somewhat better. Per capita food expenditure was the most 
accurate alternative measure of food poverty. 
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Common Characteristics of Food Deficit Households 
Using a variety of techniques, including deciles, poverty 
indices , misclassification tables, and regression analysis, 
the distribution of particular geographic, demographic and 
income variables were examined for their association with low 
levels of food expenditure. Several factors were found to be 
associated with low levels of per adult equivalent food 
expenditure. 
The vast majority of Zambia 1 s food poor households are 
found in rural areas. Rural households have per adult 
equivalent food expenditures almost half that of urban 
households. Some provinces were found to have greater food 
poverty rates than others, particularly the Eastern, Luapula 
and Southern provinces. 
Household size proved to be a very significant predictor of 
food poverty also. Larger households tended to be much more 
likely to have lower per capita food expenditures than smaller 
households. The percentage of household members that are less 
than six years old (preschoolers) was also negatively 
correlated with food expenditures. The dependency ratio 
(calculated as the number of adult members in a household 
divided by the number of children in the household ) was not 
useful in predicting food poverty. 
Many characteristics of the head of the household were 
useful in identifying food poor households . The most 
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important characteristic was the level of education of the 
household head. Households where the head has little or no 
education were the most likely to suffer from low food 
expenditures. Marital status and employment status of the 
household head were not important predictors of food poverty. 
The association of female headship was unclear due to a 
difference in the distribution of food shares for female 
headed households . Food shares in female headed households 
tended to be greater than male headed households. Since the 
measure of welfare is food expenditure, the greater propensity 
to consume food by female headed households means that they 
are less likely to fall into the food poverty groups even 
though their incomes may be less than some of the food poor 
households. If a policy objective of the food subsidy program 
is income transfer to poor households, then basing the measure 
of welfare on food expenditure will eliminate many needy 
female headed households from receiving the benefits. 
The number of different sources of income for a household 
is positively correlated with food expenditures. Multiple 
sources of income are important in the household's ability to 
generate revenues from different sectors and take advantage of 
the most lucrative market. As incomes increase, so do food 
expenditures . This finding has implications for off-fann 
income generating opportunities in alleviating rural food 
poverty. 
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Consumption Patterns of Food Defi cit Households 
The composition of the food basket changes as households 
increase their per adult equivalent food expenditure. Lower 
per adult equivalent food expenditure households consume more 
carbohydrate source foods, such as grains and tubers, while 
higher per adult equivalent food expenditure households 
consume more meats and fish. In order for a food subsidy 
program to reach poorer households it must provide subsidies 
on thos e products most commonly consumed by poor households . 
The dep endence of households on commercial food markets 
increases with higher levels of per adult equivalent food 
expenditure. Since poor, and especially rural, households 
produce most of their own food, food subsidies on marketed 
commodities are not likely to reach them and , therefore, may 
not be effectively targeted subsidies . 
Food Policy Alternati ves 
The brief hist ory of food subsidies in Zambia points out 
many of t he problems encountered with Zambia's urba n maize 
subs idy . This generalized subsidy went to anyone who chose to 
purchase either breakfast meal or roller meal, but was 
confined in operations to urban areas only. Such a program 
i s, arguably, the very least effective, and perhaps the mos t 
counterproductive, s ubsidy scheme if the goal of the s ubsidy 
program is to improve the nutritional situation of Zambia's 
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poorest households . 
The generalized maize subsidy only operated in urban areas 
where, as was shown in chapter 7, there is a much lower 
incidence of food poverty than in rural areas. This is not 
necessarily a flaw in the policy because rural households, 
with their lower proportions of purchased foods, are not in 
the position to take advantage of the subsidy. But, the 
generalized subsidy had a distortionary effect on producer 
maize prices that further impoverished rural households. 
Much of the maize subsidy program expenditures went to 
subsidize breakfast meal, a commodity that is more important 
in the diets of households with already higher per adult 
equivalent food expenditures. Therefore, the absolute amount 
and, perhaps even the relative amount, of the food subsidy 
benefit was lower for the most food-poor households . 
The results from this study suggest that a food stamp 
program targeted to the poorest urban households may be the 
best solution to meeting social welfare goals while containing 
the cost of the subsidy program. The maize coupon program 
that had been established in Zambia in 1989 and was terminated 
in 1991 should serve as a guiding experience in formulating a 
new food subsidy program . The maize coupon program though, 
suffered from a lack of tight control and too broad of a 
target population. The targeting indicators revealed by this 
study would be most useful as a set of initial screening 
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criteria before a more rigorous means testing for inclusion in 
the program is conducted. The most useful targeting 
indicators as revealed by this analysis are rural location, 
residence in the Eastern or Luapula provinces, large numbers 
of household members, urban households with an older head , and 
households headed by a person with little or no education. 
Economic theory suggests that people are rational and will, 
in the absence of price distortions, maximize their utility 
from any given basket of goods and services . Food coupons 
that are exchangeable for a variety of foods, and not just 
maize meal, will give poor consumers the latitude to choose 
those foods that best fill their particular nutritional needs. 
Nonspecific food coupons will help to reduce distortions in 
food prices that result from increased demand for the 
subsidized product. 
Self-targeted commodities had been difficult to identify. 
Zambia's previous experience with the self-targeting of roller 
meal in 1986 went badly wrong and the country may be loath to 
try it again . Many of the poor people's foods identified in 
chapter 9, such as tubers and cassava flour, do not store well 
for long periods and would require an extensive domestic 
marketing system to provide a constant supply; a market that 
may be inefficient at best. Some suggestions of subsidizing 
imported yellow maize have been considered in place of the 
preferred white maize. But, experiences in other East African 
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countries have shown that there is often leakage of yellow 
maize to commercial livestock operations to be used as feed . 
The emphasis in meeting the food needs of poor rural 
households have more to do with off-farm employment 
opportunities, agricultural markets, and extension services. 
During the drought relief efforts of 1992-93, Zambia was able 
to develop a very successful food-for-work program that helped 
to meet the food deficits of many of the poorest rural 
households. Policy makers should consider the lessons learned 
from this experience in designing a basic needs welfare 
program targeted at food-poor rural households. 
The most important factor to be considered in creating a 
food welfare "net" for Zambia is the interaction between the 
urban and rural sectors. Rural producer households must be 
protected from any price depressing effects of a food subsidy 
program and should, if at all possible, be made the indirect 
benefactors of such a program. Food coupons increase the 
demand for food and may result in higher producer prices; non-
commodity specific coupons will spread the benefits of higher 
producer prices around to more sub - sectors within agriculture. 
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